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This Article examines an emerging movement so far unexplored by legal 
scholarship: the proposal and, in some states, the enactment of a Homeless Bill 
of Rights.  This Article presents these new laws as a lens to re-examine storied 
debates over positive and social welfare rights.  Homeless bills of rights also 
present a compelling opportunity to re-examine rights-based theories in the 
context of social movement scholarship.  Specifically, could these laws be 
understood as part of a new “rights revolution”?  What conditions might 
influence the impact of these new laws on the individual rights of the homeless 
or the housed?  On American rights culture and consciousness? 
The Article surveys current efforts to advance homeless bills of rights across 
nine states and the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico and evaluates these case studies 
from a social movement perspective.  Ultimately, the Article predicts that these 
new laws are more likely to have an incremental social and normative impact 
than an immediate legal impact.  Even so, homeless bills of rights are a critical, 
if slight, step to advance the rights of one of the most vulnerable segments of 
contemporary society.  Perhaps as significantly, these new laws present an 
opportunity for housed Americans to confront our collective, deeply-rooted biases 
against the homeless. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Moral rights are an important source of legal rights, but it is also true that 
legal rights influence the content of moral rights.1 
 
A new movement is afoot: in June 2012, Rhode Island passed the 
mainland’s first Homeless Bill of Rights.  State legislatures in 
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Connecticut, Oregon, Vermont, Missouri, 
and Massachusetts quickly followed suit, introducing their own bills.  
So far, Connecticut and Illinois have already joined Rhode Island with 
freshly enacted homeless bills of rights.  Other states are actively 
evaluating the prospects for such legislation.2 
Homeless bills of rights articulate a vibrant range of rights and 
remedies.  For example, some provide the right to shelter, sustenance, 
or health care, while others incorporate rights against employment 
discrimination or police harassment.  Some provide civil remedies for 
those whose statutory rights have been violated; at least one vests the 
creation, implementation, and enforcement of rights in an 
administrative entity.  Although these new laws illustrate varying 
substantive provisions and strategic compromises, they share the 
 
 1  Philip Harvey, Aspirational Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 701, 715 (2004). 
 2  See infra Part III.  
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overarching goal of improving the lives of homeless Americans. 
The emergence of this new legislative tool raises compelling 
questions.  What exactly is a homeless bill of rights?  What is its 
purpose?  What are the differences and similarities across jurisdictions?  
What types of rights are or should be covered?  How, if at all, are these 
rights different than those afforded to housed individuals?  Do these 
laws announce any new rights?  Or are they merely statutory 
reiterations of constitutional or civil rights already afforded to the 
homeless—or for that matter, to housed individuals?  If homeless bills 
of rights are only statutory reiterations of already existing rights, how 
might these laws meaningfully improve the lives of homeless people? 
On the other hand, if homeless bills of rights actually purport to 
create new rights for homeless people—such as positive social welfare 
rights—should advocates fight for judicial enforcement provisions?  If 
a right is not judicially enforceable, is it really a right at all?  Many legal 
scholars and homeless advocates contend that judicial enforceability is 
the sine qua non of a right.3  Indeed, virtually all homeless bills of rights 
advanced on the mainland United States explicitly provide for civil 
remedies.4  But others dispute the necessity of judicial enforceability to 
the realization of a right,5 instead emphasizing the realization of rights 
through agency implementation.6  After all, judicial rulings do not 
necessarily translate to agency implementation; to the contrary, 
judicial enforcement may be ineffectual7 or even provoke legislative 
repeal of a law.8  Accordingly, should homeless advocates expend 
significant resources to ensure homeless bills of rights contain civil 
remedies provisions?  What approach best ensures the implementation 
and realization of rights for homeless Americans? 
By their very nature, homeless bills of rights invite such robust 
rights-based inquiries.  Ultimately, the value of a homeless bill of rights 
must be measured by its potential contribution to the lives of homeless 
Americans.  Of course, any ideal outcome would significantly revise 
how American society perceives, values, and incorporates homeless 
people—the law would be part of a social movement that transforms 
 
 3  See infra notes 232, 233, and accompanying text. 
 4  See Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of Provisions.  Massachusetts is an 
outlier, explicitly stating that the law does not create a new private right of action that 
would not already otherwise exist.  See H. 3595, 188th Reg. Sess. § 31(d) (Mass. 2013). 
 5  See infra Part Part III.C. Indeed, many scholars question whether rights really 
exist at all.  See generally, Michael McCann, The Unbearable Lightness of Rights: On Sociolegal 
Inquiry in the Global Era, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 245 (2013). 
 6  See discussion infra Part IV.C.   
 7  See discussion infra Part IV.C.   
 8  See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
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relationships between the housed and homeless from exclusive to 
inclusive.  In this respect, homeless bills of rights might be understood 
as part of an effort to naturalize a normative vision.  Social movement 
theory can help to explain how such a normative vision might become 
a reality. 
This Article is the first to identify and analyze the new, growing 
phenomenon of homeless bills of rights in the United States.  The 
Article is enriched with feedback and insights of homeless advocates 
nationwide, the result of dozens of interviews with advocates inside and 
outside of active jurisdictions.  Part I introduces the specific context of 
homeless advocacy, spotlighting key issues with homelessness in the 
United States.  Part II surveys case studies of current efforts to enact 
homeless bills of rights in nine states and Puerto Rico.  This section 
briefly describes the history, content, and status of these bills, and 
draws substantive and strategic comparisons among these case studies.  
Part III introduces a rights revolution framework.  Specifically, this 
section surveys rights-based theories and their application to social 
movement “rights revolutions.”  It applies a rights revolution 
framework to these case studies and analyzes the potential challenges 
and benefits of this new legislative tool, both from a practical and 
theoretical perspective.  The Article concludes that homeless bills of 
rights are more likely to have an incremental social and normative 
impact than an immediate legal impact.  Even so, these new laws are 
an important step toward a long-overdue rights revolution for one of 
America’s most vulnerable populations.  Perhaps as significantly, these 
new laws present an opportunity for housed Americans to confront our 
persistent, deeply-rooted biases against the homeless.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9  The use of “the homeless,” an adjective, to refer to non-housed human beings, 
can be fairly criticized as dehumanizing.  Some advocates, however, (such as the 
National Coalition for the Homeless) commonly use the phrase interchangeably as a 
noun and as an adjective.  In this Article, I’ve tried to err on the side of using the 
phrase as an adjective unless such use impacts readability.  I’ve also attempted to make 
analogous use of the phrase “housed” to refer to people with stable housing 
conditions. 
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II.  SNAPSHOT OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
the wretched refuse of your teeming shore.  Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to 
me.  I lift my lamp beside the golden door!10 
 
Despite the Statue of Liberty’s welcoming message, the homeless 
remain one of the most vulnerable, reviled, and underserved 
populations in America.  Estimating the number of homeless people 
in the United States is an elusive task11 and, in the endeavor, it is easy 
to forget that numbers represent real human beings.  There are no 
definitive estimates of U.S. homelessness, but some commonly cited 
numbers suggest that anywhere from 650,000 to 3.5 million Americans 
are homeless at any given time.12  Nearly 40 percent of these people are 
families with children.13 
 
 
 10  The Statue of Liberty bears these first two lines of this sonnet from Emma 
Lazarus, “The New Colossus.”  Statue of Liberty National Monument, 
LIBERTYSTATEPARK.COM, http://www.libertystatepark.com/emma.htm (last visited Feb. 
17, 2015). 
 11  The slipperiness of the effort partly reflects the various ways and purposes the 
homeless may be defined or categorized into subcategories or subpopulations.  The 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) considers an individual 
homeless if he or she lives in an emergency shelter, transitional housing program, safe 
haven, or a place not meant for human habitation, such as a car, abandoned buildings, 
or on the street.  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013 Annual 
Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, at 2 (2013) [hereinafter HUD 2013 Report to 
Congress].  But HUD also categorizes homelessness in various ways.  See, e.g., id. at 2 
(distinguishing definitions of “Chronically Homeless” and  “Sheltered Homeless”).  
Moreover, the data can also be complicated by the use of varying baselines and 
measurements of time: estimates might focus on a single evening, a particular week, 
year, or other increment.  See, e.g., infra note 12. 
 12  Estimates vary depending on the methodology used.  The lower estimate comes 
from the latest U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development single-night-
count, which is an annual “point-in-time” estimate of persons homeless on a single 
night.  HUD 2013 Report to Congress, supra note 11, at 22.  These point-in-time 
estimates are highly controversial and criticized for undercounting homelessness.  See, 
e.g., National Coalition for the Homeless, How Many People Experience Homelessness?, 
NATIONALHOMELESS.ORG (July 2009), http://nationalhomeless.org/.  The higher 
estimate of 3.5 million is an annual estimation of Americans that experience 
homelessness over the course of a single year.  See National Alliance to End 
Homelessness, A Snapshot of Homelessness, ENDHOMELESSNESS.ORG, http://www.end 
homelessness.org/pages/snapshot (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).  Homelessness is a 
difficult number to measure definitively; the rising number of “unsheltered homeless” 
shows that more people—especially families—are sleeping in shelters, living in their 
cars, and taking up residence in tent communities.  HUD 2013 Report to Congress, 
supra note 11, at 20 (stating that unsheltered homeless individuals increased in major 
cities in 2012). 
 13  Id. at 3–4. 
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In fact, homeless families represent one of the fastest growing 
segments of the homeless population.14  Children comprise 
approximately 23 percent of the homeless population.15  The majority 
of homeless children are under the age of seven.16  According to a 2011 
study by the National Center of Family Homelessness, approximately 
one out of every forty-five children in the United States experiences 
homelessness at some point in the year.17  The number of homeless 
school children has grown dramatically; in 2011–2012, 40 states 
reported increases in their homeless student populations, and ten 
states reported increases of 20 percent or more.18  Last year, the 
number of homeless students enrolled in U.S. preschools and K-12 
schools reached a record high of at least 1,168,354 children.19 
Although one measure suggests a national decline in 
homelessness of nearly 4 percent from 2012 to 2013,20 several states 
experienced a substantial increase in homelessness for the same time 
period.21  According to the latest U.S. Conference of Mayors report, 60 
percent of surveyed cities reported a 7 percent average increase in 
 
 14  The percentage of homeless families increased by 1.4 percent (or 3,222 people) 
from 2011 to 2012.  HUD 2013 Report to Congress, supra note 11, at 3. 
 15  The United States Conference of Mayors, A Status Report on Hunger and 
Homelessness in America’s Cities: A 23-City Survey, at 13 (2007). 
 16  The Characteristics and Needs of Families Experiencing Homelessness, at 5, NATIONAL 
CENTER ON FAMILY HOMELESSNESS (2011), http://www.familyhomelessness.org/ 
media/306.pdf.  
 17  National Center on Family Homelessness, Children, AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR 
RESEARCH (2010), http://www.familyhomelessness.org/children.php?p=ts. 
 18  Brent Staples, Homeless Kids in Rough Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013 
(reporting data from the National Center for Homeless Education). 
 19  U.S. Hits Record Number of Homeless Students, FIRSTFOCUS.ORG (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://firstfocus.org/news/press-release/u-s-hits-record-number-homeless-students/ 
(citing data from the U.S. Department of Education).  First Focus reports this is the 
“highest number on record, and a 10 percent increase over the previous school year.  
The number of homeless children in public schools has increased 72 percent since the 
beginning of the recession.”  Id.  Significantly, the estimate of homeless students is an 
underestimation of the number of homeless children in the United States.  Id.  (“[The] 
data [does] not include homeless infants and toddlers, young children who are not 
enrolled in public preschool programs, and homeless children and youth who were 
not identified by school officials.”). 
 20  This estimate comes from the HUD single-night count data, which are soundly 
criticized as underestimations of homelessness.  See HUD 2013 Report to Congress, 
supra note 11, at 1, 6; see also How Many People Experience Homelessness?, NATIONAL 
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (July 2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/ 
factsheets/How_Many.html. 
 21  The U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2012 Status Report on Hunger & Homelessness, at 
2, available at http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/2012/1219-report-HH.pdf 
[hereinafter 2012 Conference of Mayors Report]; see also HUD 2013 Report to 
Congress, supra note 11, at 8. 
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homelessness overall.22  The number of homeless families increased in 
71 percent of cities by an average increase of 8 percent.23  And 
approximately 60 percent of cities expect the number of homeless 
families to continue to increase over the next year.24 
The causes of homelessness are commonly misunderstood.  A 
popular instinct is to blame homeless people for their condition,25 but 
research consistently indicates that the leading cause of homelessness 
is lack of affordable housing.26  In fact, approximately 17 percent of 
homeless adults are employed, but still unable to afford housing.27  For 
families with children, the most common causes of homelessness also 
include poverty, unemployment, eviction, and domestic violence.28 
Emergency shelter does not compensate for the lack of affordable 
housing.  Due to lack of sufficient shelter, approximately 64 percent of 
cities turn away homeless families with children; shelters in 60 percent 
of cities turn away unaccompanied individuals.29  This sustained 
increase in the unsheltered homeless warrants particular concern, 
because this subpopulation is the most vulnerable to death, illness, 
violence, and a litany of other maladies compared to sheltered 
individuals.30  This subpopulation is also most affected by 
criminalization measures and ordinances, which penalize them for 
living on the streets and in public places.31  But, as explained below, 
 
 22  2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. at 3. 
 25  See generally JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1993) (analyzing and debunking persistent “myths” that homeless people are 
“somehow responsible for their own poverty”); see also discussion infra Part II.A.  
 26  2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2.  Popular sentiment 
suggests that the housed perceive the causes of homelessness to be attributable to 
those who experience it; in other words, a persistent myth is that homelessness is 
caused by homeless people themselves.  See discussion infra Part II.A.  
 27  2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2.  See also Mireya Navarro, 
In New York, Having a Job, or 2, Doesn’t Mean Having a Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, 
at A1 (citing a study that “‘contrary to popular belief,’ 79 percent of homeless heads 
of family had recent work histories . . . .”). 
 28  2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2.  Approximately 16 
percent of single homeless adults are victims of domestic violence.  I 
d. 
 29  Id. at 3. 
 30  See, e.g., The Hard, Cold Facts About the Deaths of Homeless People, NATIONAL HEALTH 
CARE FOR THE HOMELESS COUNCIL (May 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HardColdFacts.pdf.  
 31  National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, Report: Criminalizing Crisis: 
The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, at 6 (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.nlchp.org/Criminalizing_Crisis [hereinafter 2011 NLCHP Report].  See 
generally National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, No Safe Place: The 
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both temporarily sheltered and unsheltered people shoulder these 
special burdens. 
A. Hated & Homeless 
People are afraid to get out of their cars when they see a homeless person . . . 
They haven’t been a problem.  They just scare people.32 
 
Perhaps the greatest barrier to homeless rights is the prevalence 
of societal animus toward homeless people.  Princeton University 
psychology professor, Susan Fiske, has spent years documenting 
persistent and deeply-held prejudice against poor and homeless 
people.33  Professor Fiske’s research shows that housed people 
frequently perceive homeless Americans as things, not as human 
beings.34  Moreover, her research suggests that housed individuals react 
to poverty and homelessness with revulsion instead of sympathy.35  
Documented prejudice against the homeless is often associated with 
efforts to justify the prejudice: assumptions that homelessness is 
entirely self-induced helps to validate societal disdain.36  But this 
 
Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities (July 2014), http://nlchp.org/ 
documents/No_Safe_Place [hereinafter 2014 NLCHP Report]. 
 32  A business owner in Richland, South Carolina quoted in Alan Blinder, South 
Carolina City Takes Steps to Evict Homeless from Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, at 
A15.  
 33  See, e.g., Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: 
Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006) 
(describing study results placing homeless people in the “lowest” category, which 
“elicits the worst kind of prejudice—disgust and contempt—based on moral violations 
and subsequent negative outcomes that these groups allegedly caused themselves”); 
ALEXANDER TODOROV, SUSAN FISKE, & DEBORAH PRENTICE, SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: 
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 3 (2011) (describing 
how study participants “dehumanized [homeless people] as ill-intentioned, inept, 
unfamiliar, dissimilar, strange, and not uniquely human or quite typically human”); 
Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Social Groups That Elicit Disgust Are Differentially 
Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 45, 45–51 (2007) 
(finding study participants dehumanize homeless people as stimuli that elicit 
“disgust”). 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Joel Blau discusses this tendency and explains his efforts 
to distinguish carefully between a reasonable interest in the population’s 
characteristics and the rather obsessive preoccupation with those 
individual traits—drugs, alcoholism, or mental illness—which some use 
to explain their current status.  Once we acknowledge that these 
personal characteristics are not sufficient explanations of homelessness, 
we can begin to explore the real causes. 
BLAU, supra note 25.  See also Timothy Egan, Govern in Poetry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013) 
(discussing societal tendency to blame the poor and concluding “that making the poor 
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impulse flies in the face of extensive research on contributors to 
homelessness, which suggests a more complex picture.37  This 
disconnect is particularly acute with respect to the fastest growing 
segment of the homeless population—families with children—whose 
circumstances are not as easily attributed to “their fault.”38 
But scientific and economic research is not necessary to prove 
societal animus toward the homeless; popular culture abounds with 
examples of glorified violence against the homeless and anti-homeless 
sentiment.39  For example, a recent issue of Maxim magazine suggested 
to its readers: “Kill one for fun.  We’re 87 percent sure it’s legal.”40  
Similarly, popular fight videos and viral hits, such as “Bumfights,” 
feature “fights between homeless men plied by the producers with 
alcohol, as well as sadistic assaults, where terrified sleeping homeless 
people are startled awake and bound with duct tape.”41  The 
dehumanization of homeless people can take other forms of 
entertainment.  In Seattle, a “self-proclaimed entrepreneur” offers 
$2,000 “Homelessness Tours,” where voyeurs can get a thrill by 
“checking out . . . homeless haunts” and “try[ing their] hand at 
panhandling or sleeping on a park bench.”42 
 
out to be lazy, or dependent, or stupid, does not make them less poor[,] [i]t only 
makes the person saying such a thing feel superior.”). 
 37  See, e.g., 2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2 (highlighting 
variables such as lack of affordable housing, poverty, and unemployment as key 
factors); BLAU, supra note 25, at 33–59 (discussing various studies of economic causes 
of homelessness); BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, MAKING ROOM: THE ECONOMICS OF 
HOMELESSNESS 4–6 (1996) (analyzing various causes of homelessness and remarking 
that “[a]lcoholism is no more an explanation of homelessness than meteorite failure 
is an explanation of war”); Maria Julia & Helen P. Harnett, Exploring Cultural Issues in 
Puerto Rican Homelessness, 33 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 4, 318–30 (1999) (concluding, 
in part, that socio-cultural variables “such as familialism and intergenerational 
dependency” are unique and critical influences in Puerto Rican homelessness). 
 38  2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2 (listing primary causes 
of homelessness for families as lack of affordable housing, poverty, unemployment, 
eviction, and domestic violence). 
 39  Crimes Against America’s Homeless: Is the Violence Growing?, S. 111–915, 111th Cong. 
at 57 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg64876/ 
pdf/CHRG-111shrg64876.pdf (statement of Professor Brian H. Levin, California State 
University); see also id. at 171–229 (statement of the National Coalition for the 
Homeless). 
 40  Id. at 60 (statement of Professor Brian H. Levin, California State University). 
 41  Id. 
 42  See Mark Byrnes, People in Seattle Are Outraged By This $2,000 “Homeless Tour”, 
CITYLAB.COM (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/arts-and-lifestyle/ 
2013/10/people-seattle-are-outraged-2000-homelessness-tour/7138.  The sponsor of 
the tour maintains that his goal is to increase understanding of homelessness, but the 
playful tone of the tour itinerary and the excessive private fee has provoked criticism.  
Id. 
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Of course, dehumanizing homeless people is not limited to 
mainstream society: homeless people are frequently the targets of 
“thrill-kills” or other forms of unprovoked violence.  Indeed, the 
commission of bias-motivated violence is sufficiently common that the 
National Coalition for the Homeless publishes annual reports 
detailing the murder, torture, and assault of homeless people across 
the United States.43 
Even some elected officials appear to think open hostility toward 
the homeless is generally acceptable; recently, five-term Hawaii State 
Representative, Tom Brower, publicized his one-man effort to “clean 
up” public areas by destroying the possessions of homeless Hawaiian 
residents with a sledgehammer.44  Representative Brower told the 
media, “If someone is sleeping at night on the bus stop, I don’t do 
anything, but if they are sleeping during the day, I’ll walk up and say, 
‘Get your ass moving.’”45  Representative Brower’s campaign may seem 
unusual, but to the contrary: as explained below, efforts to rid society 
of the homeless are increasingly codified by law. 
B. The Criminalization of Homelessness 
[P]erhaps the single most significant attribute of homelessness is its visibility.  
Visible poverty disrupts the ordinary rhythms of public life.46 
 
Any effort to stem homelessness must confront the growing 
phenomenon of state statutes and city ordinances that criminalize 
homelessness.  Despite the fact that most cities lack adequate shelter 
space to allow homeless individuals the ability to conduct “life-
sustaining” activities out of the public eye, 73 percent of American 
cities have ordinances prohibiting such activities as sleeping or 
camping, eating, sitting, begging or panhandling, and urinating or 
defecating in public.47  At their core, these laws—often called “quality 
of life” laws—criminalize homeless people for visibly living in public.  
Joel Blau explains: 
 
 43  See, e.g., Hate Crimes against the Homeless: Violence Hidden in Plain View, NATIONAL 
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.national 
homeless.org/publications/hatecrimes/hatecrimes2010.pdf. 
 44  See Jim Mendoza, Lawmaker Hammers Home His Homelessness Solution, HAWAII 
NEWS NOW (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/24003737/ 
lawmaker-hammers-home-his-homeless-solution. 
 45  See Scott Keyes, State Rep Uses Sledgehammer to Destroy Homeless People’s Possessions, 
THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/11/ 
19/2966371/hawaii-homeless-smash/. 
 46  BLAU, supra note 25, at 4. 
 47  2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 6–7. 
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[P]ublic displays of poverty are somehow improper.  Since 
only the most desperate people exhibit their poverty, the 
slightest glimpse of their desperation makes others feel 
uneasy.  Witnesses to homelessness then become like the 
unwilling spectators of an intimate domestic quarrel.  They 
know these things occur, but firmly believe they should be 
kept private if at all possible.48 
Thus, criminalization laws are not an effort to address homelessness; 
instead, these laws seek to improve the quality of life of the housed by 
reducing the visibility of the homeless through incarceration or 
dislocation.49 
Such city ordinances criminalizing homelessness continue to 
increase.  Of 234 cities surveyed by the National Law Center on 
Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP), 53 percent prohibited begging 
or panhandling in public places, 40 percent prohibited camping in 
public places, and 33 percent prohibited sitting or lying down in public 
places.50  These laws authorize police to perform “sweeps” to clear 
public areas of homeless people.51  Police sweeps often result in the 
confiscation and destruction of personal belongings, including 
identification, documentation, medications, and other property of 
sentimental value.52 
Criminalization measures can also perpetuate homelessness by 
creating barriers to access.53  First, the loss of important documentation 
during police sweeps impedes the affected person’s ability to provide 
necessary identification for employment, housing, social services, and 
benefits.54  Second, if a homeless person violates a “quality of life” 
ordinance, she can face criminal penalties such as arrest, jail time, and 
fines.55  Many employers and Public Housing Authorities perform 
criminal background checks to determine baseline eligibility.56  In 
addition, some states terminate or suspend certain social services and 
benefits when a person has been incarcerated.57  As a result, homeless 
individuals who have been penalized for violating these ordinances 
 
 48  BLAU, supra note 25, at 4.   
 49  See, e.g., Professor Robert Adleman, University of Buffalo, quoted in Blinder, 
supra note 32, at A15 (“[T]hese ordinances and policies just redistribute homeless 
persons.  They don’t solve the problem of homelessness.”). 
 50  2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. at 28. 
 54  Id. at 21. 
 55  Id. at 15, 35. 
 56  31 2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 32–34. 
 57  Id. 
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find themselves unable to obtain gainful employment, permanent 
housing, or services and benefits. 
Criminalization laws do not merely target homeless people; these 
laws also target people and organizations that might try to feed them.  
Homeless people are among those who struggle daily with hunger and 
inadequate access to food.58  Nevertheless, cities also increasingly target 
individual citizens and groups who attempt to share food with the 
hungry.59  These municipalities use a variety of legal prohibitions and 
restrictive policies to stop or discourage the sharing of food with the 
homeless.60  Violators of these anti-food sharing laws can face 
significant criminal and financial penalties.61  Los Angeles, 
Philadelphia, Seattle, and Orlando are just a few of more than thirty 
cities that have either adopted or debated legislation to ban the 
feeding of homeless people in public places.62 
 
 
 58  Approximately 82 percent of surveyed cities reported that emergency food 
assistance increased in 2011 by an average of 22 percent.  2012 Conference of Mayors 
Report, supra note 21, at 1.  According to surveyed cities, approximately 19 percent of 
people needing emergency food assistance do not receive it.  Id.  In 95 percent of 
surveyed cities, emergency food distributors had to reduce the quantity of food 
allocated to needy people because of a lack of resources.  Id.  In 89 percent of cities, 
these facilities had to turn hungry people away.  Id.   
 59  See generally National Coalition for the Homeless and the National Law Center 
on Homelessness & Poverty, A Place at the Table: Prohibitions on Sharing Food with People 
Experiencing Homelessness, NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Dec. 2010), 
available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/Food_ 
Sharing_2010.pdf.  See generally National Coalition for the Homeless and the National 
Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Feeding Intolerance: Prohibitions on Sharing Food 
with People Experiencing Homelessness, NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Nov. 
2007), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/ 
Food_Sharing.pdf. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. at 3.  These laws are particularly punitive in light of recent cuts to the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), which provides food assistance 
to approximately 47 million people.  Additional cuts may be on the horizon, as 
Congress considers a Farm Bill that would further cut SNAP food assistance.  See Brad 
Plumer, Food Stamps Will Get Cut By $5 billion This Week — And More Cuts Could Follow, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
wp/2013/10/28/food-stamps-will-get-cut-by-5-billion-this-week-and-more-cuts-could-
follow/.  The cuts are expected to put more pressure on the hungry and to increase 
demand at food banks. 
 62  Lawrence Downes, Insert Homeless Headline Here, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2013) 
(surveying city efforts to ban feeding programs and observing that “[o]nce you move 
the homeless out of sight, they are almost out of mind.”); Adam Nagourney, As 
Homeless Line Up for Food, Los Angeles Weighs Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at A1 
(reporting on the L.A. ordinance and observing the city’s homeless “situation. . . has 
stirred no small amount of frustration and embarrassment among civic leaders, now 
amplified by fears of the hungry and mostly homeless people, who have come to count 
on these meals.”). 
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Advocates nationwide argue that these increasingly popular laws 
violate homeless Americans’ constitutional rights and basic human 
dignity.63  The discriminatory and pernicious impact of these “quality 
of life” laws makes them a top priority for many advocates.64 
C. The Costs of Homelessness 
Anytime there’s a dollar tag, there will be a problem.65 
 
Homeless bills of rights are critical tests, not only of societal 
attitudes toward the homeless, but also of societal and legislative 
attitudes toward positive rights.  Economic and social rights are 
sometimes referred to as “positive rights” because they create new 
government obligations or actions.66  Civil and political rights, on the 
other hand, are often referred to as “negative rights” because they 
recognize a right to be left alone; negative rights are protections from 
state interference or intrusion.67  Positive rights are commonly 
perceived to be more expensive than negative rights; however, this 
proposition is hotly debated.68  Moreover, some research suggests that 
positive social welfare rights remedies are less costly and more effective 
than other alternatives.69  Nonetheless, in American politics, positive 
 
 63   See, e.g., 2014 NLCHP Report, supra note 31.  For example, the American Civil 
Liberties Union recently filed suit on behalf of a homeless couple in Miner, Missouri, 
a city in one of the states considering a homeless bill of rights.  See Kevin Murphy, A 
Homeless Couple Sues a Missouri Town for Asking Them to Leave, REUTERS, Dec. 16, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-usa-homeless-missouri-
idUSBRE9BG03820131217. 
 64  Each of the advocates interviewed identified criminalization of homelessness, 
frequently along with a right to housing, as a top priority.  See, e.g., Telephone interview 
with Jim Ryczek, Executive Director, Rhode Island Coalition for the Homeless (Feb. 
27, 2013); Telephone interview with Paul Boden, Organizing Director of Western 
Regional Advocacy Project (Feb. 22, 2013); Telephone interview with Alison Eisinger, 
Executive Director, Seattle King County Coalition on Homelessness (Feb. 28, 2013); 
Telephone interview with Karina O’Malley, Founder of Crossroads Justice Center & 
Shelter, Green Bay, Wisconsin (Feb. 28, 2013); Telephone interview with Lynn Lewis, 
Executive Director, Picture the Homeless, New York City (Mar. 4, 2013). 
 65  Telephone interview with Adam Arms, Legal Coordinator, Western Regional 
Advocacy Project (WRAP) (Feb. 25, 2012). 
 66  Frank Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 863–64 (2001).   
 67  Id.  Observe also that many scholars critique the distinction between positive 
and negative rights as misleading.  See, e.g., id. at 875–77; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare 
Rights & the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1909 (2004). 
 68  See generally, STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:  WHY 
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (W.W. Norton & Co. 1999) (explaining that all legal 
rights—both positive and negative—must be enforced by the government and 
therefore no right is costless). 
 69  See, e.g., infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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rights discourse commonly centers on money.70 
For example, many advocates point to evidence that a primary 
cause of homelessness is a lack of affordable housing;71 therefore, any 
serious legislative effort to advance homeless rights must address 
affordable housing.72  Opponents respond that affordable housing 
remedies are, well, unaffordable.73  Whether advocates prioritize 
affordable housing, health care, job training, education, or other 
positive remedies to stem homelessness, the apparent magnitude of 
the problem invites rejection.  It is not economically or logistically 
feasible, opponents maintain, to solve homelessness. 
 
 
 
 70  Frank Cross channels this sort of “pragmatic, consequentialist” evaluation of 
positive rights.  Cross, supra note 66, at 878.  He proposes various problems with 
positive rights, including what he calls “the economics of rights enforcement,” “the 
politics of rights enforcement,” and “the practical effect” of rights enforcement.  Id. at 
862.  As a result, Cross observes that positive social welfare rights “are rare and quite 
limited”; generally, these rights are most clearly recognized when they “conform to 
majoritarian sentiment” and do not “impose substantial costs” on government 
budgets.  Id. at 873.  Although Cross focuses on constitutional positive rights, his 
critique has similar implications for positive statutory rights—such as a right to 
housing— that might be articulated in a homeless bill of rights. 
 71  Interviewed advocates expressed consensus on the lack of affordable housing as 
a primary cause of homelessness and as a priority issue.  See, e.g., Interview with Karina 
O’Malley, supra note 64; Interview with Eisinger, supra note 64; Interview with Ryczek, 
supra note 64; Interview with Boden, supra note 64.  Advocates’ perspectives are 
confirmed by other studies, including the latest U.S. Conference of Mayor’s report.  
2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21. 
 72  Housing is considered affordable when its cost constitutes 30 percent or less of 
a household’s monthly income.  The State of Homelessness in America 2012, at 24, 
NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (Jan. 17, 2012), http:// 
www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-of-homelessness-in-america-2012.  
In 2010, however, approximately one in four U.S. renter households spent 50 percent 
or more of their monthly income on housing.  Id.  In 2010, some states saw a severely 
high housing cost burden of over 80 percent of monthly household income.  Id.  Even 
in states with relatively low levels of housing cost burden, more than half of households 
below the poverty line still spent more than 50 percent of their income on housing.  
Id. 
 73 See, e.g., Mai Thi Nguyena, Victoria Basolob & Abhishek Tiwarib, Opposition to 
Affordable Housing in the U.S.A.: Debate Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30 
HOUSING, THEORY, & SOC’Y 2, 107–30 (2012) (discussing opponents’ many motivations 
and arguments, including costs); Editorial, Extreme Budget Cuts of 2014, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/opinion/sunday/extreme-
budget-cuts-of-2014.html?_r=0 (highlighting pending legislation to cut HUD 
affordable housing programs in light of economic pressures); Annie Lowrey, As 
Automatic Budget Cuts Go Into Effect, Poor May Be Hit Particularly Hard, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/us/politics/poor-face-most-pain-as-
automatic-budget-cuts-take-effect.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the impact of 
sequestration cuts on housing programs). 
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Instead, the impulse for legislative bodies is often to pursue what 
are perceived as cheaper, quicker fixes to “solve” homelessness.  
Frequently, these fixes amount to “out of sight and out of mind” 
strategies that remove the homeless from sight— such as 
criminalization laws or relocation initiatives.74  For example, some 
cities—such as Honolulu, New York City, Baton Rouge, and San 
Francisco—have attempted to weed out homeless residents by offering 
them free, one-way transportation out of state.75  Supporters maintain 
that these programs are an effort to return homeless residents to 
friends or relatives in other states; critics argue that such programs 
misdirect public funds in a transparent effort to “pass[] the problem 
of homelessness to another city,” instead of investing in solutions to 
homelessness.76 
 
 
 
 
 74  These criminalization or “quality of life” laws demonstrate the Broken Windows 
theory of community development: the first signs of poverty in a community are like 
the first broken windows; they must be repaired or removed immediately to prevent 
spreading deterioration.  See, e.g., Historical Criminalization Fact Sheet Homeless Bill of 
Rights Campaign, at 2, WESTERN REGIONAL ADVOCACY PROJECT, available at 
http://wraphome.org/images/stories/ab5documents/HistoricalCriminalizationFact
Sheet.pdf.  Adherents to this theory may view homeless people as “broken windows” 
that should be removed for the good of the community.  Id.  Joel Blau explains some 
of the psychological motivations behind Broken Windows laws:  
If one encounter with a homeless person is awkward, the cumulative 
effect of many such encounters is discordant. Some people are generous 
and do not mind occasional requests for money.  Too many requests, 
though, soon exhaust their generosity.  Losing their capacity to engage 
in single charitable acts, they are increasingly inclined to see 
homelessness as a disfigurement of the landscape, and begging as a 
personal assault.  After a while, public opinion sours, and demands 
intensify to get the homeless off the street. 
BLAU, supra note 26, at 4.  Such Broken Windows laws overtax the criminal justice 
system and cost taxpayers substantially more than providing housing for the homeless.  
See 2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 37–40.  Advocates also contend these laws 
contradict traditional standards of fairness embodied in the Bill of Rights, especially 
the right to due process, the right to free speech, and the right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Id. at 19. 
 75  See, e.g., Olivia B. Waxman, Hawaii Offers Homeless One-Way Tickets Out of State, 
TIME.COM (July 31, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/07/31/hawaii-offers-
homeless-one-way-tickets-out-of-state/.  In a similar vein, states such as Nevada,have 
been sued by other municipalities for allegedly bussing homeless people out of state.  
See Rick Lyman, Once Suicidal and Shipped Off, Now Battling Nevada Over Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 2013, at A17 (describing class action lawsuit brought by San Francisco against 
state of Nevada and suggesting similar incidents in other cities). 
 76  Waxman, supra note 75 (quoting Arnold S. Cohen, CEO of Partnership for the 
Homeless). 
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These common legislative responses avoid engagement with the 
thorny questions about whether or how positive rights could be 
afforded to the homeless.77  Efforts to hide the visibility of homelessness 
not only fail to address the underlying problems of homelessness, but 
research suggests that such efforts are costly and ineffective in the long-
run.  Several studies show that incarceration of the homeless costs 
more than the provision of shelter or permanent housing.78  Some 
projections estimate that on average, a city spends approximately $87 
per day to incarcerate a person, compared to $28 per day to provide 
shelter for that person.79  Other studies suggest a correlation between 
the provision of permanent supportive housing and a decrease in costs 
for incarceration, emergency room admissions, and behavioral health 
care.80 
The perennial debate over the cost-benefits of increasing support 
and services versus increasing penalties and enforcement is a 
fundamental and enduring tension.81  As explained below, this tension 
persists in the latest method of homeless advocacy: the state-level 
enactment of a homeless bill of rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 77  These avoidance strategies do not mean the legislative body avoids a normative 
judgment or action about whether positive rights should be afforded.  To the contrary, 
such inaction is in fact a normative choice that reinforces social and distributive 
hierarchies that often disfavor minority rights.  See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative 
Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2330 (1990) (making similar 
observations and describing “governmental inaction [as] a choice . . . [that] reinforces 
incentives which are already skewed against supervisory control over government 
employees, and encourages the unbridled discretion which leads to unconstitutional 
conduct.”) 
 78  See Cost Savings with Permanent Supportive Housing, NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END 
HOMELESSNESS (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/cost-
savings-with-permanent-supportive-housing (charting the changes in state 
expenditures pre- and post-placement of homeless individuals in permanent 
supportive housing across four cities and one state); see also Cost of Homelessness, 
NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www. 
endhomelessness.org/pages/cost_of_homelessness (surveying various studies 
concluding that permanent housing options are more cost-effective than the provision 
of temporary shelter). 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  See generally HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 68 (arguing that all rights cost 
money, and therefore debates over the allocation and recognition of rights are, at their 
core, debates over the cost-benefit of those rights). 
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III. CASE STUDIES: CURRENT EFFORTS TO ADVANCE HOMELESS BILLS OF 
RIGHTS 
Homeless bills of rights present the threshold question of whether 
the government should make statutory commitments to positive or 
negative rights for the homeless.  Other inquiries logically follow: if the 
government makes such statutory commitments, what should the 
scope of those commitments be?  Should they be aspirational?  Or must 
they be capable of sustained implementation by government agencies?  
If the commitments are expected to improve the circumstances of 
homeless people, what redress should exist if the government fails to 
deliver on its commitments? 
Several American jurisdictions are spotlighting these 
conversations by proposing, and in some instances enacting, statewide 
homeless bills of rights.  This section offers a brief overview of 
significant developments in Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and California. 
A. Puerto Rico: An Administrative Approach to Rights 
In 1998, Puerto Rico broke a barrier in U.S. homeless advocacy.  
It was the first U.S. territory to pass a homeless bill of rights, a legislative 
declaration of specific rights that belong to Puerto Rico’s homeless 
citizens.  Few mainland advocates interviewed for this Article reported 
knowing much or—in some instances—knowing anything about 
Puerto Rico’s homeless bill of rights.  Indeed, at the time of this 
writing, no other English scholarship has reported or evaluated Puerto 
Rico’s homeless rights legislation.82  The lack of mainland knowledge 
regarding Puerto Rico’s laws might be attributed to geographical 
distance and separation, distinctions between Puerto Rico’s civil law 
tradition and the mainland’s common law tradition, language barriers, 
or real or perceived cultural or demographic differences.83  In any 
 
 82  Efforts to locate Spanish legal scholarship on Puerto Rico’s Homeless Bill of 
Rights laws were also unsuccessful. 
 83  The impact of Puerto Rico’s culture, civil law tradition, and demographics 
present a rich and complex area for continued research.  A very limited handful of 
studies suggest some starting points for legal scholarship to examine the impacts of 
these socio-cultural variables on the recognition of homeless rights, social welfare or 
positive rights, perceptions of agency, and the role of the state.  See, e.g., Julia & 
Harnett, supra note 37, at 318–30 (analyzing cultural, demographic, and social 
differences between homelessness in Puerto Rico and in Columbus, Ohio and 
concluding, in part, that socio-cultural variables “such as familialism and 
intergenerational dependency” are unique and critical influences in Puerto Rican 
homelessness); Aileen Torres, Aida Garcia-Carrasquillo & Juan Nogueras, 
Sociodemographic Variables, Childhood Characteristics, and Family Risk Factors for 
Homelessness: A “Puerto Rican Paradox?”, 32 HISP. J. OF BEHAVIORAL SCI. 4, 532–48 (2010) 
(supporting Julia and Harnett’s “proposal that family factors are more salient 
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event, Puerto Rico’s unique model is a compelling source of study and 
future research.  As described below, Puerto Rico’s provision of a 
broad range of positive and negative rights is unparalleled by any 
enacted legislation on the mainland.  But the substantive scope of 
Puerto Rico’s law is not the only unique contrast with the mainland 
states; Puerto Rico’s law also articulates a detailed administrative 
scheme for homeless rights unlike any other. 
Puerto Rico is also a unique jurisdiction for homeless rights 
because the Constitution of Puerto Rico, adopted in 1952, specifically 
identifies the homeless as a suspect class.84  Still, abuses of homeless 
rights increased during the 1990s.85  In 1998, Puerto Rico passed Act 
250 to “provide services for the homeless, [and] to implement a well-
integrated public policy that will allow these persons to meet their basic 
needs and have their rights respected.”86  Conceived as an 
administrative plan to mitigate homelessness, Act 250 established a 
commission within the Department of the Family, which was tasked 
with coordinating the efforts of government agencies, the private 
sector, and nonprofits.87  The role of the Commission was to determine 
the best course of action to implement public policy regarding the 
homeless in Puerto Rico, focusing on housing, health, employment 
and income, and access to government services.88  Act 250 was not 
intended to be judicially enforceable; instead, the creation, 
 
predictors of risk in [Puerto Rico’s homeless] population than other 
sociodemographic variables such as poverty and education levels” and proposing 
future research analyze “collectivism, interdependence, familismo, and 
multigenerational households and their relationship to homelessness”).  There is a 
similar dearth of scholarship examining the impact of Puerto Rico’s civil law tradition 
on social, cultural, political, and legal consciousness; such scholarship could help 
guide future research on Puerto Rico’s Homeless Bill of Rights.  See, e.g., Marta 
Figueroa-Torres, Recodification of Civil law in Puerto Rico: A Quixotic Pursuit of the Civil 
Code for the New Millennium, 12.1 ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. (May 2008), available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-21.pdf.  
 84  See Telephone interview with Osvaldo Burgos Pérez, Chairman of the 
Commission on Human Rights and Constitutional Law Society and Professor of Law 
at the University of Puerto Rico School of Law (Feb. 27, 2013); see also Telephone 
interview with Glorin Ruiz Pastush, Volunteer at La Fondita de Jesus (Feb. 22, 2013).  
The Puerto Rico Constitution specifically recognizes “the right of every person to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
and especially to food, clothing, housing, and medical care, and necessary social 
services.”  P. R. CONST. art. II, § 20.  The Constitution also specifically prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of “social condition.”  P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 85  P.R. CONST. art. II § 1.  See also Interview with Pastush, supra note 84. 
 86  Act No. 250, 13th Leg., 3d Sess. (P.R. 1998) (repealed 2007). 
 87  Id.  The new commission, the Commission for the Implementation of the Public 
Policy Regarding the Homeless, was structured as a committee chaired by the Secretary 
of the Department of the Family. 
 88  Id. at 6–10. 
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implementation, and enforcement of the law was entirely vested in the 
Commission.89 
Shortly thereafter, in 2000, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto 
Rico90 observed that “the homeless have rights in Puerto Rico . . . but 
on many occasions, due to their health, financial and social conditions, 
they do not know or are unable to claim their rights.”  Accordingly, the 
Assembly passed Act 277.91  The purpose of Act 277 is to “impart . . . 
legitimacy not only to the homeless, but also to any representative of 
any assisting organization, be it public or private.”92  Act 277 allows 
advocacy groups to serve as “intercessors” for homeless individuals and 
act on their behalf in legal proceedings.93  It also requires that the court 
try cases involving homeless individuals through quicker summary 
proceedings and waive court fees.94 
Despite these advances, by 2007, the Assembly noted that the 
Commission had “not developed models to address the homeless 
situation.”95  Realizing that the government was only one among many 
different service providers for the homeless, the Assembly decided that 
a multi-sector approach would be more effective.96  In September of 
2007, the Assembly repealed Act 250 and replaced it with Act 130, 
which created a Multi-Sector Homeless Population Support Council.97 
The new Act 130 “aims to achieve the goal of eradicating 
homelessness . . . [and] make Puerto Rico a place where all human 
beings have a roof over their heads, and prompt and sensitive access to 
the basic services every human being is entitled to receive.”98  The Act 
 
 89  Id. 
 90  Act No. 277, 13th Leg., 7th Sess. (P.R. 2000).  The Asamblea Legislativa de 
Puerto Rico is the territorial legislature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which 
is responsible for the legislative branch of the government of Puerto Rico.  The 
Legislative Assembly is a bicameral legislature consisting of an upper house, the 
Senate, and the lower house, the House of Representatives.  Every bill must be passed 
by both houses and signed by the Governor of Puerto Rico to become law.  The 
structure and responsibilities of the Legislative Assembly are defined in Constitution 
of Puerto Rico which vests all legislative power in the Legislative Assembly.  In relevant 
respects, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico is comparable to the bicameral 
structure and process of other state legislative bodies on the mainland.  See generally 
Asamblea Legislativa, OSLPR.ORG, http://www.oslpr.org/new/asamblealegislativa.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 91  Act No. 277, 13th Leg., 7th Sess. (P.R. 2000). 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at § 698. 
 94  Id. at § 691–701. 
 95  Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess. (P.R. 2007). 
 96  Id. at 14. 
 97  Id. at 21. 
 98  Id. 
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enumerates several positive and negative rights guaranteed to the 
homeless, including the right to shelter;99 nourishment;100 medical 
attention;101 all social services and benefits for which they qualify;102 
workforce training;103 protection from law enforcement officers against 
any kind of mistreatment;104 and free access to parks, town squares, and 
other public facilities.105 
Like the Commission created under Act 250, the Multi-Sector 
Council created under Act 130 was similarly situated in the 
Department of the Family and chaired by its Secretary.106  However, in 
addition to retaining the former Commission’s purpose of 
implementing and developing policy and strategy, the Council was also 
tasked with “seeking and developing new options” to provide services 
and housing for the homeless.107  The twenty-one member Council is 
comprised of nine members from the government sector, nine 
members from a coalition of homeless services—two of whom must 
have experienced homelessness—and one member from the private 
sector.108  Like its predecessor, Act 130 is not judicially enforceable; 
instead, it tasks the Council with responsibility for designing protocols 
to ensure agency implementation of the enumerated rights and with 
responsibility for enforcing compliance.109 
In December 2007, a few months after the passage of Act 130, 
members of the Assembly noted the persistent lack of protocols to 
facilitate access to public services.110  That month, the Assembly enacted 
Act 199, which required all government departments and agencies to 
establish protocols for the access and rendering of services to the 
homeless and to establish awareness trainings on homeless rights.111  
Act 199 also announced plans to publish these protocols for public 
inspection, thereby increasing accountability of service providers, 
including the government.112 
 
 99  Id. at § 5(a)(1). 
 100  Id. at § 5(a)(2). 
 101  Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess § 5(a)(3) (P.R. 2007). 
 102  Id. at § 5(a)(4). 
 103  Id. at § 5(a)(5). 
 104  Id. at § 5(a)(6). 
 105  Id. at § 5(a)(8). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess § 5(a)(8) (P.R. 2007). 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. at § 6. 
 110  S.B. 1455, 15th Leg., 6th Sess., at 1–2 (P.R. 2007). 
 111  Id. at 1. 
 112  Id. at 4. 
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Most recently, in 2012, another bill for the protection of the 
homeless was introduced in the Puerto Rico House.  The proposed bill, 
3912, noted that, despite prior legislation, “very little has been 
achieved in advancing the effort to improve the situation of 
homelessness.”113  To address this perceived lack of progress, 3912 
proposed specific procedures for identifying and treating homeless 
people suffering from substance abuse, physical, or mental health 
issues.114 
In many respects, Puerto Rico’s Homeless Bill of Rights is 
visionary.  Puerto Rico’s consistent enactment of homeless rights 
legislation over nearly two decades suggests that the notion of 
homeless rights may not be as politically divisive or as socially 
unpopular as it appears in many mainland jurisdictions.115  The law 
articulates a broad range of positive and negative rights that many 
mainland advocates identify as ideal.  Moreover, as explained below, 
Puerto Rico’s administrative scheme also resonates with many social 
movement analyses, which observe that any fundamental change in 
human rights must engage not only the legislative branch, but also 
administrative entities.116 
But many homeless advocates in Puerto Rico believe that the law, 
while substantively strong, has not been properly implemented or 
enforced.117  Some of these failures clearly relate to limited resources.  
For example, the Council is housed in the Department of Family, 
which has a broad set of responsibilities that distract it from sufficiently 
addressing the demands of Act 130.118  Indeed, the president of the 
Council is the Secretary of the Department of Family, and she has been 
“too busy” to preside over the Council’s meetings.119  Moreover, the 
administrative scheme is wracked by conflicts of interest:  the Council 
is responsible for designing, implementing, and enforcing the law; the 
 
 113  P. of C. 3912, SENADO.PR.GOV (Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.senadopr. 
us/Proyectos%20del%20Senado/pc3912-ta.pdf.  
 114  Id. 
 115  Interview with Francisco de Jesus, former attorney and current volunteer at La 
Fondita de Jesus (Feb. 25, 2013) (noting that Puerto Rico’s political parties generally 
agree on policies that support homeless rights; “[t]he most difficult part is the 
implementation; once you’ve achieved that [policy].”). 
 116  See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
 117  Interview with Osvaldo Burgos Pérez, supra note 83; Interview with Francisco de 
Jesus, supra note 115; Interview with Pastush, supra note 84; Telephone interview with 
Tim Sherwood, retired professor of humanities and current volunteer with La Fondita 
de Jesus (Feb. 25, 2013). 
 118  See Interview with Pérez, supra note 84. 
 119  Interview with Sherwood, supra note 117. 
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law can impose administrative fines of up to $5,000 per violation.120  But 
nearly half of the Council’s twenty-one members are also heads of the 
government agencies responsible for implementing the law.121  
Accordingly, advocates are pushing for new legislation to either 
relocate the Council in the Housing Department, where some 
advocates see a more logical fit with issues affecting the homeless,122 or 
to convert the Council into a more autonomous or quasi-governmental 
agency, perhaps comparable to the Civil Rights Commission.123 
The challenge of implementation has sparked some interest in 
amending the law to provide for judicial enforceability;124  the hope is, 
of course, that mobilizing judicial protections of homeless rights will 
result in more effective implementation and enforcement.  As 
explained below, judicial enforcement might serve such a role, but the 
outcomes can be highly contextual and varied.125  Certainly, Puerto 
Rico’s unique administrative plan articulates ambitious goals for the 
island’s homeless residents.  But if the legislation still lacks sufficient 
implementation and enforcement, does it have a meaningful impact 
on homeless rights?  Rhode Island’s experience provides helpful 
comparisons. 
B. Rhode Island: A Blueprint of Negative Rights 
On June 20, 2012, Rhode Island became the first mainland state 
to pass a homeless bill of rights; as such, it has quickly become a model 
for many other mainland U.S. advocates that are evaluating similar 
legislation.  Indeed, at the time of this writing, Illinois126 and 
Connecticut127 already passed homeless bills of rights based on the 
Rhode Island template.  Hawaii, Oregon, Vermont, Missouri, and 
Massachusetts base their bills on Rhode Island’s model, but have yet to 
 
 120  Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess § 7(k) (P.R. 2007). 
 121  Interview with Sherwood, supra note 117. 
 122  Id.  But not all interviewed advocates favor relocation of the Council to another 
agency department.  See, e.g., Interview with Pérez, supra note 84. 
 123  Interview with Sherwood, supra note 116; Interview with Pérez, supra note 84; 
Interview with Francisco de Jesus, supra note 115; Interview with Pastush, supra note 
84. 
 124  Interview with Pérez, supra note 84 (discussing the advantages of judicial 
enforceability, but stressing that those advantages cannot be realized without adequate 
access to counsel and to the judicial process).   
 125  See infra Part IV.C.  
 126  Bill of Rights for the Homeless Act, Pub. L. 098-0516, 2013 Ill. Laws, available at 
http://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/98/PDF/098-0516.pdf; see also Table 1, Cross-
Jurisdictional Comparison of Provisions. 
 127  Homeless Person’s Bill of Rights, Pub. L. 13-251, 2013 Conn. Acts 1714; see also 
Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of Provisions. 
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enact such a law.128 
Even as a prototype, Rhode Island’s motivations for the bill are 
common: the recent economic downturn and a lack of affordable 
housing transformed Rhode Island’s homeless relief efforts into a 
“system bursting at the seams.”129  Since 2008, the number of homeless 
Rhode Islanders has increased by 24 percent.130  Annual statistics from 
2011 to 2012 show a 12.6 percent increase in homeless families; a 16.9 
percent increase in homeless children; and a 23 percent increase in 
homeless veterans.131  Rhode Island’s shelters, already stretched 
beyond capacity, have been unable to accommodate the influx of 
newly homeless individuals.132  Homeless individuals seeking jobs face 
persistent discrimination from employers on the basis of their housing 
status, creating persistent barriers to employment.133  Service providers 
report that homeless clients routinely face harassment and 
discrimination, not just from housed individuals generally, but also 
specifically from city service workers, such as police and bus drivers.134  
Despite these grim prospects, in 2011, the Rhode Island legislature cut 
funding for a supportive housing plan earmarked for helping 
homeless people return to stable living situations.135  In response, 
homeless advocates gained the support of a few legislators, who 
introduced several bills to assist homeless Rhode Islanders.136  One of 
these bills was the Rhode Island Homeless Bill of Rights, which was 
 
 128  H.B. 1205, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013); H.B. 3122, 77th. 2013 Reg. Sess. 
(Or. 2013); H. 493, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013); S.B. 428, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Mo. 2013); H.B. 3595, 188th. Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013). See also Table 1, Cross-
Jurisdictional Comparison of Provisions. 
 129  Tracey O’Neill, RI’s Homeless Numbers Climb by More Than Ten Percent, GO  LOCAL 
PROV (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.golocalprov.com/news/ris-homeless-numbers-
climb-by-more-than-ten-percent/. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Statistics on the Homeless In Rhode Island, RHODE ISLAND COALITION FOR THE 
HOMELESS, 
http://www.rihomeless.org/AboutHomelessness/HomelessnessStatistics/tabid/248/
Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 132  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64. 
 133  Telephone interview with John Tassoni, Jr., State Senator, Rhode Island State 
Senate (Feb. 27, 2013). 
 134  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64. 
 135  Id. 
 136  These bills included S. 2203, a bill to fund supportive and affordable housing, 
and S. 2307, a bill requiring banks to allow residents in foreclosure to remain in their 
homes by paying rent.  Both S. 2203 and S. 2307 remain in Committee.  See Passing the 
Homeless Bill of Rights, RHODE ISLAND COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Apr. 7, 2013), 
http://www.rihomeless.org/Resources/HomelessBillofRights/HomelessBillofRights
Passage/tabid/275/Default.aspx. 
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enacted just a few months later.137 
The Rhode Island Homeless Bill of Rights was passed as an 
amendment to the state’s Fair Housing Practices Act.138  It specifically 
incorporates the state’s constitutional equal protection provisions139 
and provides that “[n]o person’s rights, privileges, or access to public 
services may be denied or abridged solely because he or she is 
homeless.”140  The statute enumerates seven negative rights for 
homeless Rhode Islanders: the right to (1) “use and move freely in 
public spaces;”141 (2) “equal treatment from all state and municipal 
agencies;”142 (3) be free from employment discrimination based on 
housing status;143 (4) receive emergency medical care without 
discrimination based on housing status;144 (5) vote;145 (6) non-
disclosure or confidentiality of public records;146 and (7) “a reasonable 
expectation of privacy” for personal property.147 
The law does not grant homeless Rhode Islanders any new or 
special rights; indeed, it expressly provides that these rights are “the 
same rights and privileges as any other resident” of Rhode Island.148  
These rights, however, are judicially enforceable. Accordingly, 
aggrieved plaintiffs can seek “injunctive and declaratory relief, actual 
damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” if their rights are 
violated under the new law.149 
 
 
 137  S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012). 
 138  One result of the amendment to the state’s Fair Housing Practices Act is to add 
“housing status” to a list of explicitly articulated groups that are afforded protection 
against housing discrimination, including “race, color, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, country of ancestral origin, 
or disability, age, familial status” or victims of domestic violence.  Id. at § 34-37-1(b). 
 139  Id. at § 34-37.1-2(2). 
 140  Id. at § 34-37.1-3. 
 141  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(1). 
 142  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(2). 
 143  S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 34-37.1-3(3) (R.I. 2012). 
 144  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(4). 
 145  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(5) (prohibiting discrimination in voter registration and other 
voting-related processes). 
 146  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(6) (providing the “right to protection from disclosure of his 
or her records and information provided to homeless shelters and service providers to 
state, municipal and private entities without appropriate legal authority; and the right 
to confidentiality of personal records and information in accordance with all 
limitations on disclosure [under federal law]”). 
 147  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(7) (the right to privacy of personal property is co-extensive to 
“personal property in a permanent residence”). 
 148  Id. at § 34-37.1-3. 
 149  S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 34-37.1-4 (R.I. 2012). 
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The bill was amended during the legislative process, shedding 
light on substantive and strategic negotiations between Rhode Island 
advocates and policymakers.  Like many advocates nationwide, Rhode 
Island advocates viewed the right to housing and anti-criminalization 
efforts as top priorities.150  Accordingly, the original draft humanized 
the problem of homelessness, grounding the legislation in the 
“fundamental belief [that] no person should suffer unnecessarily from 
cold or hunger, or be deprived of housing or the basic rights incident 
to such shelter from the elements.”151  The original draft also proposed 
several positive rights, such as the right to certain public services and 
benefits152 and to legal counsel.153  These provisions, however, were 
narrowly drafted to confirm these rights were either co-extensive with 
those already afforded to “any” citizen154 or were subject to existing 
eligibility guidelines.155  Perhaps the most ambitious (and therefore, 
controversial) provision in the original draft guaranteed “the right to 
fair, decent and affordable housing in the community of his or her 
choosing, and access to safe and proximate shelter until such housing 
can be attained.”156  Advocates knew the right to housing provision was 
a long shot; the legislature would likely perceive such a provision as too 
costly and reject it out of hand.157  But after extensive discussion, 
including consultation with homeless Rhode Islanders, advocates felt 
the right to housing was too important not to include.158  Even the 
proposal of a right to housing could serve as a “rallying cry” for 
constituents and spark important conversations about the dire housing 
conditions for many Rhode Island adults and children.159 
 
 
 150  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64. 
 151  S. 2052, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 34-37.1-2(2) (R.I. 2012), available at 
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText12/SenateText12/S2052.pdf. 
 152  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(9) (confirming “the right to receive public benefits and 
services offered to any other citizen of this state in accordance with the established 
eligibility guidelines for those services”). 
 153  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(7) (providing “the right to legal counsel equal to that extended 
to any other citizen of the state”). 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(9) (confirming “the right to receive public benefits and 
services offered to any other citizen of this state in accordance with the established 
eligibility guidelines for those services”). 
 156 Id. at § 34-37.1-3(4) (providing “the right to fair, decent and affordable housing 
in the community of his or her choosing, and access to safe and proximate shelter until 
such housing can be attained”). 
 157  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64. 
 158  Id.  (describing one consideration as, “Can’t we just have the fight first, before 
we pull out the provision?”). 
 159  Id. 
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As advocates predicted, the original draft’s emphasis on social 
welfare rights such as hunger and housing was softened significantly in 
the revised Substitute A—presumably to remove any suggestion that 
the state would be obligated to address problems such as cold, hunger, 
or housing issues.  Instead, the statement of legislative intent was 
reframed to emphasize the problem of discrimination.  As revised, 
Substitute A articulated the “fundamental belief [that] no person 
should suffer unnecessarily or be subject to unfair discrimination 
based on his or her homeless status.”160  Substitute A also removed 
advocates’ preferred provisions for the right to certain services and 
benefits and to legal counsel, despite the fact that these provisions were 
narrowly drafted and ultimately announced already existing rights.  
Perhaps less surprisingly, the controversial right to housing and shelter 
provision was also removed. 
Although advocates lost some ground in Substitute A, the new 
draft gave clearer emphasis to advocates’ other priority of de-
criminalizing homelessness.  First, Substitute A revised the “right to 
equal treatment by all police departments” to a more precise “right to 
equal treatment by all law enforcement agencies . . . including the right 
to be free from searches or detention based upon his or her actual or 
perceived housing status.”161  Substitute A also articulated a new 
provision: “the right not to be subject to criminal sanctions for resting 
or sleeping in a public place in a non-obstructive manner when there 
is no available and accessible shelter space.”162  Both of these provisions 
directly confronted various municipal and state laws that advocates 
maintain criminalize the conduct of life-sustaining activities in 
public.163 
Unfortunately for homeless Rhode Islanders, neither of 
Substitute A’s new criminalization provisions survived in the final, 
enacted bill.  Law enforcement agencies reacted negatively to being 
singled out for the “equal protection” provision, so advocates struck a 
compromise by broadening the language to encompass “all state and 
municipal agencies.”164  On the one hand, this development could be 
perceived as an improvement because the right to equal protection 
now arguably covers not only law enforcement agencies but also all 
 
 160  S. 2052, Sub. A, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 34-37.1-2(3) (R.I. 2012), 
available at http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText12/SenateText12/S2052A.pdf. 
 161  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(2). 
 162  Id. at § 34-37.1-3(4). 
 163  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64.  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1 (2013) 
(prohibits the obstruction of sidewalk or building entrance). 
 164  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64. 
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other state and municipal agencies.  The broader language, however, 
could also be perceived as obscuring advocates’ efforts to spotlight the 
specific role of law enforcement in violating the basic rights of 
homeless Rhode Islanders.165  Moreover, the compromised language 
no longer articulated the right to “be free from searches or detention” 
based on one’s status as a homeless person.  This omission, combined 
with the removal of “the right not to be subject to criminal sanctions 
for resting or sleeping in a public place,” scrubbed the bill of any 
specific provisions to combat the criminalization of homelessness.166 
Still, advocates felt the revised Substitute B was a significant 
development: it would be the first state law to specifically focus on the 
basic rights of homeless citizens, it drew some attention to problems of 
discrimination against the homeless, and it fortified seven 
fundamental negative rights that were not being realized for Rhode 
Island’s homeless citizens.167  Accordingly, Substitute B, the final 
version of the bill, was passed the last day of the legislative session.168 
Because Rhode Island’s bill was the first to be successfully enacted 
on the mainland, it is unsurprising that most mainland jurisdictions 
have adopted Rhode Island’s as a model.169  Illinois and Connecticut 
recently enacted homeless bills of rights inspired by Rhode Island; 
Oregon, Missouri, Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts are among the 
states considering similar legislation.170  Based on Rhode Island’s 
template, many of these state proposals include the right to (1) move 
freely in public spaces, (2) receive equal treatment by state and 
municipal authorities, (3) be free from discrimination while seeking 
 
 165  See generally 2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31 (discussing the role of law 
enforcement in constitutional and civil violations of homeless people’s rights).  See 
generally 2014 NLCHP Report, supra note 31. 
 166  The removal of the right to rest in public spaces came as a surprise to advocates; 
the provision easily passed the Senate on the last day of the legislative session, and 
advocates did not learn it was removed later that day in the House until the law was 
already passed.  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 (describing the removal of the 
anti-criminalization measure as occurring “off the radar”). 
 167  Id. (explaining that it would have been “counterproductive to complain” about 
the removal of the anti-criminalization provision in light of the passage of the overall 
bill); Interview with Tassoni, supra note 133 (stressing that housing and employment 
discrimination was still a significant issue for homeless Rhode Islanders and thus a 
significant “short term” target for advocates). 
 168  S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012). 
 169  Most mainland advocates interviewed for this Article had not heard of Puerto 
Rico’s legislation or did not know much about it.  Although this Article reports on 
Puerto Rico’s legislation to provoke comparisons and contrasts with emerging laws on 
the mainland, further research should examine Puerto Rico’s potential as a model for 
mainland advocacy.  
 170  See supra note 128. 
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or maintaining employment, (4) receive emergency medical care, (5) 
vote, register to vote, and receive documentation necessary for voter 
registration, (6) be protected from disclosure of information or 
records conveyed to a temporary residence such as a shelter, and (7)  
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding personal property.171  Most 
of the proposals also allow for reasonable attorney’s fees for prevailing 
plaintiffs.172  Some also amend existing law to add a definition of 
“housing status” to either the housing or civil rights code.173 
Rhode Island and Puerto Rico enacted the first two homeless bills 
of rights in the United States, and some rudimentary but helpful 
contrasts can be drawn between them.  First, Puerto Rico’s law is far 
more expansive, both in terms of its longer history (the first law was 
enacted in 1998), the number of laws encompassed within it (Puerto 
Rico has enacted over half a dozen significant laws relating to homeless 
rights), and the scope of the provisions (Puerto Rico provides not only 
negative rights, but also a broad range of positive rights, including 
rights to shelter, food, job training, and healthcare).174  By contrast, the 
new Rhode Island law articulates seven negative rights, all of which are 
rights that are currently afforded to housed citizens.  Moreover, the 
Rhode Island statute does not anticipate an administrative scheme.  
Unlike Puerto Rico’s plans for administrative design, implementation, 
and enforcement of homeless rights, the Rhode Island law centers on 
judicial enforcement.175 
Some could question whether Rhode Island’s law can produce 
meaningful change.176  In the most critical light, Rhode Island’s model 
could be criticized for bending on advocates’ top priorities such as a 
right to housing, right to counsel, anti-criminalization, and provisions 
specifically identifying the need for equal treatment from law 
enforcement.  The result, some might argue, is that the Rhode Island 
law articulates rights already enjoyed by everyone—whether housed or 
homeless.  The Rhode Island law does not articulate any new rights 
 
 171  See Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons of Provisions. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. 
 174  See generally Act No. 250, 13th Leg., 3d Sess. (P.R. 1998) (repealed 2007); Act 
No. 277, 13th Leg., 7th Sess. (P.R. 2000); Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess. (P.R. 2007).  
Compare Act No. 250, Act No. 277, and Act No. 130 with S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012). 
 175  S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 34-37.1-4 (R.I. 2012). 
 176  See, e.g., Interview with Arms, supra note 65 (admiring Rhode Island’s 
accomplishments but opining that “Rhode Island’s model is probably not strong 
enough” for California’s needs); Interview with Eisinger, supra note 64 (opining that 
the “priority” is affordable housing and any homeless bill of rights that does not 
advance housing could distract legislators from taking more important action). 
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and arguably does not address the most pressing needs of homeless 
people. 
But others insist that even incremental progress is progress, and 
Rhode Island advocates are advancing an incremental strategy.177  
Rhode Island advocates plan to wait a year or so and gather evidence 
of how the law is working.  If necessary, they plan to return to the 
legislature and ask for amendments to fix areas that may not be 
working well.178  Such a longer-term, incremental strategy may be 
particularly fitting for Rhode Island, where advocacy is constrained by 
a legislative session of approximately five to six months, shorter than 
some other jurisdictions.179  As explained below, even modest, 
incremental gains can help to precipitate progressive rights reform. 
C. California: Mainland Ambitions for Positive Rights 
California’s bill is a canary in a coal mine.180 
 
Although originally modeled after the Rhode Island Homeless 
Bill of Rights, the California bill—proposing a broad range of twenty-
three rights—was markedly different out the chute.  California 
Assemblyman, Tom Ammiano, first introduced the Homeless Person’s 
Bill of Rights and Fairness Act on December 3, 2012.181  In April 2013, 
the first amended bill passed the California Assembly’s Judiciary 
Committee by a majority vote of 7 to 3.182  The bill was originally 
 
 177  Galanter, infra note 264, at 127 (discussing social movements and incremental 
progress).  All advocates interviewed for this Article appreciated the practical value of 
incremental advocacy.  See, e.g., Interview with Arms, supra note 65; Interview with 
Pastush, supra note 84 (noting advocates’ desire to achieve greater progress, but noting 
the current law is “better than nothing”); Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 
(explaining shortcomings in the current law, but stating, “When politicians do 
something good, and you come back and say, ‘You didn’t do it good enough,’ they 
don’t react well to that.”). 
 178  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64. 
 179  See, e.g., Dates of 2013 State Legislative Sessions, BALLOTPEDIA (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://ballotpedia.org/Dates_of_2013_state_legislative_sessions.  Rhode Island’s 
legislative session is roughly comparable to the duration of most other states using 
Rhode Island’s law as a model, including Hawaii’s 2013 legislative session of 
approximately four months, and 2013 sessions in Missouri, Oregon, Illinois, and 
Connecticut of approximately five months.  See id.  California has a relatively long 
legislative session—approximately nine months.  See id.  This longer legislative session 
may support different substantive and strategic choices in California than in the other 
reviewed states. 
 180  Interview with Arms, supra note 65. 
 181  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (introduced). 
 182  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 4, 2012 
and Apr. 30, 2012). 
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expected to go to a full vote of the House Assembly in January 2014.183  
But then the bill moved to the Appropriations Committee, which 
suspended the bill, effectively killing it for the 2013 legislative 
session.184  Soon after, advocates received the devastating news that the 
bill’s original sponsor, Assemblyman Ammiano, was retiring and would 
not reintroduce the bill in the 2014 legislative session.  Without a 
sponsor, California’s bill languished.  But, California’s advocates are 
not finished fighting,185 and the bill’s history (and perhaps the bill’s 
eventual reincarnation) offers valuable insights. 
The bill’s introductory language provides that “every person in 
the state, regardless of actual or perceived housing status, income level, 
mental illness, or physical disability, shall be free from specified forms 
of discrimination and shall be entitled to certain basic human 
rights.”186  It compares discrimination against the homeless to a long 
legacy of discriminatory laws that have since been repudiated, 
including Jim Crow laws from the segregation era, anti-Okie laws from 
the 1930’s, which made it illegal to bring poor Dust Bowl immigrants 
into California, and so-called “Ugly” laws which made it illegal for 
persons with “unsightly or disgusting” disabilities to appear in public.187 
The California bill provides negative rights similar to those in 
Rhode Island, but also includes some of the advocates’ priorities that 
were ultimately cut from Rhode Island’s bill, such as adequate housing 
and shelter,188 access to legal counsel,189 equal treatment from law 
enforcement,190 and anti-criminalization provisions.191 Also similar to 
Rhode Island, the California bill contemplates judicial remedies for 
aggrieved plaintiffs whose rights are violated.192 
 
 183  Bill History, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION (Feb. 10, 2015), 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml. 
 184  Telephone interview with Paul Boden, Organizing Director, Western Regional 
Advocacy Project (Dec. 20, 2013). 
 185  See, e.g., Civil Rights Issues, WRAPHOME.ORG, http://wraphome.org/work/civil-
rights-issues (last visited Feb 18, 2015) (discussing “WRAP Civil Rights”).  
 186  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 4, 2012 
and Apr. 30, 2012). 
 187  Id. at § 2.  The Western Regional Advocacy Project (WRAP), a key homeless 
advocacy player in efforts to pass California’s bill, describes these historical analogues 
in its Criminalization Fact Sheet.  Criminalization Fact Sheet, WRAPHOME.ORG, 
http://wraphome.org/images/stories/wohotkpdf/criminalization%20fact%20sheetf
ix%20crossword.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 188  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(a)(2) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 
4, 2012 and Apr. 30, 2012). 
 189  Id. at § 53.2(a)(14)–(15). 
 190  Id. at § 53.2(a)(1)–(10). 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. at § 53.6 (providing for injunctive and declaratory relief, actual, 
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But California’s bill is hardly negative rights boilerplate from 
Rhode Island: the California bill proposes more specific and detailed 
language regarding the right to engage in life-sustaining activities in 
public.193  Indeed, the original bill provided the right to urinate in 
public; this provision provoked significant negative publicity and was 
removed from the amended version.194  The amended version, 
however, arguably serves the same interest by clarifying provisions for 
sufficient public restrooms and hygienic supplies.195 
The California bill contains several other noteworthy anti-
criminalization provisions that go beyond direct protections for 
homeless people.  The bill explicitly provides protections for third 
parties that offer food or water to a homeless person, thus mooting 
anti-food sharing laws.196  Moreover, the bill requires “every local law 
enforcement agency” to compile annual statistics showing the 
“number of citations, arrests, and other enforcement activities made 
pursuant” to specifically illustrated criminalization or so-called “quality 
of life” laws.197  Law enforcement must make these statistics publicly 
 
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees). 
 193  The California bill also articulates several negative rights never formally 
proposed in the Rhode Island legislation, including but not limited to the right to pray 
or practice religion in public and the right to decline shelter and services.  See id. at § 
3(53.2)(8) (right to pray); Id. at § 3(53.2)(9) (right to decline shelter). 
 194  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 53.3 (f) (Cal. 2012) (introduced).  
Media coverage was decidedly negative.  See, e.g., Editorial, Don’t Give the Homeless a Bill 
of Rights, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.pe.com/opinion/ 
editorials-headlines/20130109-editorial-dont-give-the-homeless-a-bill-of-rights.ece. 
 195  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(c)(6) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 
30, 2012) (noting the need for “access to safe, clean restrooms, water, and hygienic 
supplies” as particularly critical given “the proliferation of closures of public 
restrooms”); Id. at § 53.4(a)–(c) (detailing the obligations of local governments to 
provide “sufficient health and hygiene centers” and of the State Department of Public 
Health to fund such centers so “at a minimum, [the centers] shall contain public 
bathroom and shower facilities”).  In this instance, the original draft’s provision for 
the right to urinate—arguably a negative right—turned out to be more controversial 
than the related positive rights to public restroom facilities and hygienic supplies.  
Although the urination may have generated bad publicity and perhaps some bad will, 
it might also have added leverage to efforts to secure restroom facilities and hygiene 
supplies. 
 196  Id. at § 53.3(b) (providing that people or organizations sharing food with the 
homeless “shall not be subject to criminal or civil sanctions, arrest or harassment by 
law enforcement”).  The original draft sought immunity from civil or criminal liability 
for public employees offering “public resources” to a homeless person.  A.B. 5, 2013–
14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(53.4) (Cal. 2012) (introduced); however, the amended 
version proposes only to protect such a public employee from employer retaliation for 
such actions.  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(53.3)(a) (Cal. 2012) 
(amended Apr. 30, 2012). 
 197  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 53.5(a) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 
30, 2012). 
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available198 and annually report them to the state Attorney General’s 
Office.199 
California advocates are also pursuing positive rights never 
formally proposed in Rhode Island,200 including “access to income 
sufficient for survival;”201 “access to clean and safe facilities,” such as 
shelters or drop-in centers “24 hours a day, seven days a week;”202 
“access to safe, clean restrooms, water, and hygienic supplies;”203 and 
access to non-emergency health care.204 
Some of the substantive differences between California’s and 
Rhode Island’s laws could be due, in part, to different strategic 
opportunities.  California’s longer legislative session allowed advocates 
to propose a broader, more ambitious bill.  Although California 
advocates believed some of the original proposals would likely need to 
be removed or softened, they also knew they had several months to 
negotiate.205  Compared to the shorter sessions of Rhode Island-
inspired states,206 California’s strategy suggests that states with longer 
legislative sessions might be able to afford to start more aggressively.  
But California’s opening strategy is not risk-free; a more expansive 
opening strategy could generate ill-will or disengagement from 
legislators who might view many of the provisions as non-starters.207 
 
 198  Id. at § 53.5(16)(b). 
 199  Id. at § 53.5(16)(c). 
 200  See Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons of Provisions. 
 201  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(a)(1) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 
30, 2012). 
 202  Id. at § 3(a)(3). 
 203  Id. at § 2(c)(7). 
 204  Id. at § 3(a)(5). 
 205  Among other significant revisions from the original bill was a change in the 
number of existing laws the bill proposed to amend: the opening paragraph of the 
original bill proposed to amend six different California codes.  A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (introduced).  The subsequent revision, however, 
proposed to amend only two codes (the civil code and government code).  A.B. 5, 
2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 30, 2012).  None of the 
interviewed advocates suggested it was an intentional strategy, but the original 
proposal of the controversial negative right to urinate in public seemed to provide 
some leverage to secure support for the positive right to sanitary facilities. 
 206  See supra note 179. 
 207  Homeless advocates recognize and regularly negotiate this delicate balance.  
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Elisa Della, Director of Neighborhood Justice Clinic, 
East Bay Community Law Center (Feb. 20, 2012) (describing homeless bill of rights 
strategies as “hoping for the moon, but willing to compromise with the stars”); 
Interview with Arms, supra note 65 (explaining that advocates cannot push “a 
conversation ender,” but need to “push the limits without being outrageous”); 
Telephone interview with Steve Diaz, Community Organizer (Feb. 27, 2012) (noting 
that if you “go in with a bang,” you can create the “political wiggle room” to 
compromise). 
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Some of the differences in jurisdictional approaches could also 
stem from different perspectives on incremental approaches to 
legislative advocacy.  Although Rhode Island’s negative-rights-only 
approach appears relatively safe compared to California’s, Rhode 
Island advocates may have a longer-term view of incremental progress.  
The Rhode Island bill, now enacted, provides a toehold for building 
statewide homeless rights.  Rhode Island advocates plan to monitor, 
evaluate, and amend that toehold as necessary—a sort of “start small, 
but grow slowly and steadily” perspective.208  By contrast, California’s 
opening strategy suggests a different view of incremental progress, one 
that requires a commitment to certain priorities before compromising 
on others. 
On the one hand, California’s approach avoids some potential 
critiques of Rhode Island-inspired bills: even after the bill was passed 
by the Judiciary Committee, California managed to preserve advocates’ 
priority positive rights (such as affordable housing, non-emergency 
health care, and adequate sanitary facilities) as well as some of the 
prized negative rights (such as anti-criminalization and equal 
treatment from law enforcement).  On the other hand, California’s 
bill—however substantively preferable it might appear to some 
advocates—has yet to be successfully enacted.  Still, California’s bill 
arguably made significant contributions to the homeless bill of rights 
movement.  Despite its ambitious provisions, the bill passed the 
Judiciary Committee by a wide majority.  The proposal itself sparked 
important public discussion about the unfair treatment of homeless 
Californians.  Although there are no clear sponsors to reintroduce the 
bill in the near future, Californian advocates promise that their efforts 
are far from exhausted.209  As with all the enacted and proposed 
homeless bills of rights, the relative risks and rewards to California’s 
approach will be revealed in time. 
IV.  A HOMELESS RIGHTS REVOLUTION? 
This section considers how homeless bills of rights might impact 
efforts to advance the social and legal rights of homeless Americans.  
Such inquiries into how the law “does or does not matter” to social 
movements are commonly framed as legal mobilization analyses.210  
 
 208  See discussion supra part III.B. 
 209  See Interview with Boden, supra note 184. 
 210  Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. 
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17, 19 (2006) [hereinafter McCann, Law and Social Movements].  As a 
preliminary matter, many legal mobilization scholars reject the necessity or the efficacy 
of legal practice as a tool for social reform, noting that the “law is a primary medium 
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Legal mobilization examines how the law can advance or constrain 
change, including how individuals might use the law to advance their 
interests.211  Ultimately, “law is mobilized when a desire or want is 
translated into an assertion of right or lawful claim.”212  Accordingly, 
rights-based inquiries are at the core of legal mobilization. 
The term “rights revolution” commonly refers to a specific 
historical development: the perceived historical shift of Supreme 
Court attention, away from an original, exclusive focus on the property 
rights of businesses and wealthy individuals and toward a more 
contemporary focus on creating, expanding, and delineating the 
individual civil rights of ordinary citizens.213  The Supreme Court’s role 
in the rights revolution left an indelible and dramatic mark on 
American government, culture, and rights consciousness.  Some 
believe the Supreme Court’s role in the rights revolution provided 
crucial and necessary support for the civil rights movement, but 
scholars still vigorously debate the causes, propriety, and legacy of the 
rights revolution.214 
 
of social control and domination.”  Michael McCann, Legal Mobilization and Social 
Reform Movements: Notes on Theory and its Application, 11 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND 
SOC’Y 225, 229 (1991) [hereinafter McCann, Legal Mobilization] (discussing such 
criticisms).  In this view, the law contributes to the maintenance of status quo power 
hierarchies and generally frustrates resistance.  Id. at 229–30.  Indeed, McCann 
acknowledges this “double-edged” tension, but concludes that legal mobilization is an 
“important innovation” for many American social movements because legal strategies 
can be used “to open up closed processes, to win formal rights for citizen participation, 
to dramatize public issues, and to provide leverage against dominant groups in 
particular battles over policy.”  Michael W. McCann & Helena Silverstein, Social 
Movements and the American State: Legal Mobilization as a Strategy for Democratization, in A 
DIFFERENT KIND OF STATE? POPULAR POWER AND DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 131, 132 
(Gregory Albo et al. eds., Oxford U. Press, 1993).  In other words, legal mobilization 
is not the only dimension of a social movement, but it can “offer varying degrees of 
opportunity or space for creative challenge” to existing patterns of social control and 
domination.  McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 230. 
 211  Frances Khan Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the 
Political System, 77 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 690, 694 (1983) (“[W]hat the populace actually 
receives from government is to a large extent dependent upon their willingness and 
ability to assert and use the law on their own behalf.”).  Legal mobilization analysts, 
however, recognize the law can be “double-edged, at once upholding the larger 
infrastructure of the status quo while providing limited opportunities for episodic 
challenges and transformations in that ruling order.”  McCann, Law and Social 
Movements, supra note 210, at 19 (citing STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF 
RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974) and GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)). 
 212  Zemans, supra note 211, at 694. 
 213  CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME 
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2 (1998). 
 214  Such debates often center on the propriety of an activist judiciary in a 
democratic society, the role of the judiciary in legitimizing rights, and by extension, 
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Nonetheless, the rights revolution should not be limited as a 
historical concept.  Studies of “the” rights revolution inform the 
potential for “new” rights revolutions that may have an analogous 
impact on rights consciousness—and ultimately, social movements—
in America.215  In other words, the interpretive lens of the rights 
revolution is not solely retrospective; it offers a compelling prospective 
framework, particularly for segments of American society that 
continue to suffer from systemic oppression and discrimination.  
Homeless people indisputably fall into this category, and one aim of 
this Article is to reframe the rights revolution framework to assess the 
substantive and strategic potential of homeless bills of rights: how 
might these new laws meaningfully advance the legal and civil rights of 
homeless people? 
One starting place is to gauge the necessary conditions for a rights 
revolution and to determine whether these conditions might exist in 
the context of homeless bills of rights.  Scholars generally describe the 
following four factors as conditions necessary to a successful rights 
revolution: (1) a strong bill of rights or other rights-based constitutions 
or charters; (2) the presence of a “support structure for legal 
mobilization, consisting of rights-advocacy organizations, rights-
advocacy lawyers, and sources of financing;” (3) an independent, 
activist judiciary; and (4) a culture of rights consciousness or a culture 
that frames disputes in terms of rights.216  Application of these four 
necessary conditions to homeless rights advocacy suggests dismal 
prospects; however, such a sobering preliminary assessment does not 
 
the necessity of judicial enforcement for successful social movements.  See, e.g., Sarah 
Staszak, Realizing the Rights Revolution:  Litigation and the American State, 38 LAW & SOCIAL 
INQUIRY 222–45 (2013); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 25 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); MARK TUSHNET, 
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Am. Hist. Ass’n 2009); Ann 
Southworth, The Rights Revolution and Support Structures for Rights Advocacy, 34 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 1203, 1208 (2000); EPP, supra note 213, at 4. 
 215  Scholars have used rights revolution studies to assess the potential for new rights 
revolutions in other countries.  See, e.g., Bruce Wilson, Institutional Reform and Rights 
Revolutions in Latin America: The Cases of Costa Rica and Colombia, 1 J. POL. IN LATIN AM. 
59 (2009) (looking at Colombian and Costa Rican court rules about access, standing, 
and formality that allowed for rights revolutions without extensive resources and 
support structures); E. S. Herron and K. A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between 
Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422 (2003) (noting 
that despite constitutional grants of power to the judiciary in the former communist 
bloc countries, informal factors such as economic conditions, executive power, and 
litigant’s identity affect how the courts operate); Lisa Conant, Individuals, Courts, and 
the Development of European Social Rights, 39 COMP. POL STUD. 76 (2006) (discussing 
power of the supra-national courts and ease of access influence on expansion of rights 
in Europe). 
 216  EPP, supra note 213, at 3. 
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doom the potential influence of homeless bills of rights. 
A. America’s Rights Charters 
The first necessary condition for a rights revolution, a strong bill 
of rights and constitutional rights, might bode well for American 
society on a general scale, but not necessarily on a specific scale for the 
homeless.  The presence of federal and state constitutions does not 
translate into positive rights for homeless people.  The constitutional 
predisposition to positive rights—such as a right to shelter, health care, 
or sustenance—is decidedly adverse: constitutional positive rights 
generally do not thrive at the federal level because the federal 
constitution is a negative charter,217 and such positive rights may not 
thrive at the state level because courts are reluctant to impose positive 
right obligations on state legislatures, even when an affirmative 
constitutional obligation is found.218  In fact, of the fifty-one 
jurisdictions analyzed for this Article, twenty-nine of the state 
constitutions provide some degree of social welfare rights that 
implicate the homeless; however, many of the specific rights that 
homeless advocates prioritize do not appear to be realized by these 
constitutional charters.219  Moreover, many of the fundamental civil 
and constitutional rights most treasured in America—rights to privacy, 
property, and freedom from discrimination—are routinely and 
especially denied to homeless Americans.220  Indeed, it is precisely these 
denials of civil and constitutional rights that spur interest in homeless 
bills of rights. 
 
 
 217  TUSHNET, supra note 67, at 1895 (describing the rejection of constitutional 
welfare rights as “conventional wisdom”); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 
(7th Cir. 1983) (calling the U.S. Constitution “a charter of negative rather than 
positive liberties”).  But other scholars contend the Bill of Rights contains positive 
rights.  See, e.g., Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 52–54; Susan H. Bitensky, 
Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to 
the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550 (1992); Bandes, supra note 
77, at 2271; compare Cross, supra note 66, at 873 (reviewing these perspectives and 
concluding “the rights recognized in the Constitution are not perfectly negative, [but] 
they are overwhelmingly oriented that way”). 
 218  Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 
33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 819 (2002). 
 219  Id.  Indeed, as discussed below, due to challenges such as implementation bias, 
the statutory articulation of social welfare rights—such as those articulated in homeless 
bills of rights—does not necessarily improve rights-based prospects for homeless 
people.  See infra note 247. 
 220  See supra note 74. 
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B. Support Structures and Financing 
Poverty and marginalization undercut the ability of the homeless 
to capitalize on the second “necessary condition” for a rights 
revolution: support structures, including material resources.221  
According to Charles Epp, rights advocacy also demands significant 
and sustained financial resources, including government-supported 
financing.222  To some, Epp’s argument may seem cynical: do rights 
really come down to money?  But ignoring the role of material 
resources in rights advocacy is “wholly unjustified,” Epp contends, 
particularly given the historical reality of an uneven “litigation playing 
field.”223  Moreover, “the judicial process is costly and slow and 
produces changes in the law only in small increments, [so] litigants 
cannot hope to bring about meaningful change in the law unless they 
have access to significant resources.”224 
But homelessness is associated with a relative lack of organization, 
power, and financial resources.225  Deficits in support structures then 
affect the potential for homeless rights advocacy and legal 
mobilization.226  Homeless people generally face significant obstacles 
to secure social change through the courts or through the legislative 
process.  Courts often punt on matters of social or economic legislation 
because judges “presume any problems will be remedied within the 
 
 221  EPP, supra note 213, at 3. 
 222  Id. 
 223  Id. 
 224  Id.  Epp’s point relates to an extensive body of social science literature 
concerning the role of social movement organizations, or SMOs, to accomplish 
change; SMOs also tend to be successful “repeat players” that can secure favorable 
outcomes through the courts.  See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–99 (1974) 
(explaining that individuals or organizations that occasionally access the courts are 
less successful in leveraging litigation to bring about social and political change than 
are “repeat player” litigants—such as affluent individuals and corporations—who can 
afford to engage in similar pieces of litigation over time); Beth Harris, Representing 
Homeless Families: Repeat Player Implementation Strategies, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 911 (1999) 
(discussing how poverty lawyers can leverage power in judicial, administrative, 
political, and social venues). 
 225  See Sara K. Rankin, Invidious Deliberation: The Problem of Congressional Bias in 
Federal Hate Crime Legislation, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 627 (2014) (discussing suspect 
classification factors of political power, organization, and representation as applied to 
homeless people); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 135 (2011) (same); BLAU, supra note 25, at 94 (“The political impairment of the 
homeless derives from the circumstances of homelessness itself.”).  See also McCann, 
Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 226 (discussing studies showing “the neediest 
groups of citizens typically lack the basic resources to employ litigation strategies”). 
 226  Id. 
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political process.”227  This deference creates a “dialogic default” 
because certain vulnerable groups are not protected by the judiciary, 
and “they also lack the types of resources typically required for effective 
political mobilization to pursue protection from the political branches 
of government.”228  When vulnerable groups like the homeless enter 
such a dialogic default, the result is the “stagnation” of their rights.229  
These challenges can impede the proposal of homeless rights in the 
first place, their implementation, or their enforcement.  Homeless 
rights advocates across the nation are a capable and committed lot, but 
they are limited in number and in financial resources.  Accordingly, 
the current support structure for homeless rights faces an uphill battle. 
C. The Role of the Judiciary 
[F]ormal legal actions to redress social wrongs are initiated almost daily, yet 
only rarely do they contribute to the development of a broad-based social movement.230 
 
The third contributor to a successful rights revolution, an activist 
judiciary, also withers when specifically applied to the homeless.  In the 
context of homeless rights, an activist judiciary would make rights-
based decisions in keeping with ideologies that recognize and value 
homeless rights.  But, as explained in this section, courts are reluctant 
to depart from mainstream norms and generally enforce laws in line 
with the status quo as defined by society through its elected branches 
of government.231  Given the general disposition of the status quo 
toward homeless people, a court is unlikely to forge new ideological 
ground on homeless rights. 
Currently active homeless bills of rights demonstrate a strong 
mainland trend to pursue judicially enforceable bills; even Puerto 
Rico—a civil law jurisdiction that has so far centered its homeless rights 
legislation on an administrative model—appears to be considering 
 
 227  See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, 
Dual Rules of Law & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 631 (2008). 
 228  Id. 
 229  Id. at 636. 
 230  McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 238. 
 231  See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 211, at 13–15 (discussing such external pressures 
on the judiciary that limit its ability to affect social reform); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 500 
(2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2067 (2002).  See also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1225 (2001) 
(noting that the Civil Rights Acts “announced great antidiscrimination principles but 
were narrowly construed by a post-Reconstruction judiciary afraid to disturb the 
political consensus in favor of racial segregation”). 
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judicial redress provisions.232  This predisposition stems from the view 
that court-centered enforcement is necessary to save a law from being 
merely aspirational.  The presumption of judicial remedies is also 
fueled by legal scholarship, which tends to equate the existence of a 
right with its enforcement.233  Indeed, rights revolution scholarship is 
predisposed to see judicial enforcement as the ultimate hallmark of a 
right.  In the rights revolution, the judiciary ultimately enforced—and 
thus, made real—civil rights and liberties.234 
Certainly, the judiciary can play a significant role in social change.  
Judicial pronouncements can benefit social movements by bestowing 
a sense of legitimacy to rights claims, mobilizing constituents, 
providing publicity, and increasing a rights claimant’s bargaining 
power.235  Even the threat of litigation can provide helpful leverage.236  
Moreover, litigation need not be successful in order to advance social 
movements; even unsuccessful litigation can support reform.237 
But the promise of judicially enforceable rights may prove 
elusive.238  First, many of the rights treasured by homeless advocates are 
rendered practically unenforceable due to real and perceived political 
and economic limitations.239  For example, in discussing Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s historic proposed entitlement to “a useful and 
remunerative job,” Cass Sunstein observed: 
 
 
 232  The vast majority of advocates interviewed for this Article stressed the vital 
importance of judicial enforcement.  See, e.g., Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 (“Do 
you want ‘feel good’ legislation, or do you want it to be enforceable?”); Interview with 
Eisinger, supra note 64 (describing judicial enforceability as “real protection” and the 
lack of judicial protection as a “problem”); Interview with Pérez, supra note 84 
(discussing the advantages of judicial enforceability). 
 233  For example, Frank Cross argues, “[t]he notion of a legal right necessarily 
implies law, which implies government enforcement.  The claim that legal rights 
require legal enforcement is tautological . . . .”  Cross, supra note 66, at 861 (discussing 
the role of government action in the definition of legal rights).  See also Holmes & 
Sunstein, supra note 68, at 43 (explaining that all legal rights depend on government 
enforcement). 
 234  EPP, supra note 213, at 3. 
 235  See, e.g., MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:  PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 144–45 (1994).  See generally Douglas NeJaime, 
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2001) (arguing that even judicial defeats 
can advance social reform movements). 
 236  MCCANN, supra note 235, at 144–45. 
 237  NeJaime, supra note 235, at 941. 
 238 See Harris, supra note 224, at 916–17 (documenting governmental retreat from 
social welfare reforms and discussing barriers to implementation of rights remedies); 
Southworth, supra note 214, at 1208 (discussing analyses of the various factors, beyond 
judicial enforcement, that determine whether rights are recognized). 
 239  Cross, supra note 66, at 880–93. 
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With respect to judicial enforcement, the difficulty [with a 
right to work] does not lie in ambiguity or vagueness, but in 
the limited resources of government and the extreme 
difficulty of ensuring the rights . . . are respected in 
practice . . . .  No nation can ensure that every citizen has a 
job; a certain level of unemployment is inevitable.240 
The potential budgetary toll of any social welfare rights legislation 
is a pragmatic constraint, both on judicial enforcement and on 
administrative implementation.241Moreover, the justiciability of 
positive rights is a political constraint.242  Although statutory rights are 
distinct from constitutional rights, if positive rights become part of 
homeless bills of rights and these rights are later challenged, courts are 
more likely to push for enforcement if these rights “seem to conform 
to majoritarian sentiment” and do not “impose substantial costs on the 
budget of the government at any level.”243  To the extent homeless 
advocates succeed in securing the inclusion of new social welfare 
remedies in homeless bills of rights, as an economic and political 
matter, the judiciary may review even statutory violations with a degree 
of caution and deference, ultimately allowing legislatures to determine 
the destiny of such laws.244 
This prediction is supported by state court trends with respect to 
statutory rights to housing.  Following the Supreme Court’s lead,245 
state courts generally refuse to recognize a right to housing in state 
 
 240  CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND 
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 210 (2009). 
 241  See generally Cross, supra note 66 (discussing pragmatic, economic limitations on 
judicial enforcement); see also Harris, supra note 224, at 922–23, 926–27 (discussing 
case studies about the budgetary influences on agency implementation). 
 242  The justiciability of social welfare rights is hotly debated.  Some scholars 
contend that judicial intervention in matters of economic and social policy is a breach 
of the separation of powers doctrine.  See, e.g., Cross, supra note 66, at 887–93 
(discussing various political critiques).  Others argue that courts frequently (and 
properly) decide issues that affect budgetary and economic policy.  See Nice, supra note 
227, at 629.  See generally Harris, supra note 224. 
 243  Cross, supra note 66, at 873–74. 
 244  Although my prediction relates to the judiciary’s review of statutory rights, it 
resonates with Mark Tushnet’s constitutional law prescription for “weak judicial 
remedies.”  Tushnet, supra note 67, at 1910–11.  Through this model, courts identify 
the violation of a right but then provide only light oversight of a remedial plan’s 
implementation.  Id. at 1910.  In light of potential constraints on judicial enforcement, 
advocates can strengthen their position by advocating for a role in implementation.  
See Harris supra note 224, at 911–17; discussion infra notes 263–268 and accompanying 
text. 
 245  Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (explaining that despite the 
importance of safe, sanitary housing, “the Constitution does not provide judicial 
remedies for every social and economic ill.”).   
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constitutions.246  But even when state courts recognize a statutory duty 
to provide housing, judicial enforcement efforts frequently prompt 
state legislatures to repeal or modify the law at issue.247  The bottom 
line is, “courts generally lack the independence and resources to 
enforce their decisions against recalcitrant groups in government and 
society.”248  As a result, the enactment of positive social welfare rights 
can be empty, symbolic legislative gestures that dissipate—even when 
tested in court.249 
Moreover, a pre-occupation with judicial enforceability obscures 
the critical role of administrative agencies in the implementation of 
rights.  Beth Harris’s work persuasively argues that lawyers 
representing homeless families must conceive of advocacy “beyond the 
courtroom into the implementation process.”250  Homeless advocates 
must assume this role because neither rights litigation nor rights 
 
 246  Most state courts refuse to recognize a constitutional duty for states to provide 
shelter; New York is a well-recognized exception.  See Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979) (recognizing a right to emergency shelter based on state 
constitutional guarantee of aid, care, and support for the needy).  
 247  A few state courts have attempted to enforce explicit, mandatory statutory 
obligations to provide shelter to the homeless. See, e.g., Baltimore v. Dist. of Columbia, 
10 A.3d 1141(D.C. 2011) (construing language that the city “shall” provide sufficient 
shelter in severe or frigid weather as a statutory entitlement, but concluding that 
plaintiffs had not established city’s failure to provide such shelter); Ctr. Twp. of Marion 
County v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring the town trustee 
to comply with emergency shelter provisions); Clark v. Milwaukee County, 524 N.W.2d 
382, 386 (Wis. 1994) (finding a $98.00 shelter stipend insufficient for “health and 
decency”); Hilton v. New Haven, No. 8904–3165, 1989 Conn. Super. LEXIS 52 (Conn. 
Super. Ct., Dec. 27, 1989) (ordering the city of New Haven to provide shelter services 
to anyone claiming to need them).  But significantly, many states and municipalities 
do not respond to such decisions by implementing the original statutory provisions; 
instead, when tested, these legislatures commonly repeal or significantly narrow their 
statutory obligations.  See, e.g., NYC Department of Homeless Services Procedure No. 12-400, 
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, available at http://coalhome.3cdn.net/3a34f202 
045a8e03d4_rgm6benw9.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (modifying the Callaghan 
consent decree by allowing implementation of state regulations to deny shelter due to 
non-compliance with administrative rules); D.C. Code § 4-751.01 (proposing to limit 
the Baltimore holding by requiring individuals seeking shelter to prove district 
residency via valid identification); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-2-1-6 (avoiding the Marion 
County holding by repealing specific code provision); 1995 Wisconsin Act 18, WISCONSIN 
STATE LEGISLATURE,  https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1995/related/acts/18 (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2015) (avoiding the Clark finding by amending county law to remove 
the burden placed upon the government.  See also Chapter 319s* Financial Assistance, 
CONNECTICUT STATE LEGISLATURE, §§ 17b-120 and 121, http://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
current/pub/chap_319s.htm#secs_17b-120_to_17b-121 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) 
(nullifying the Hilton holding by repealing state law requiring provision of emergency 
shelter by municipalities). 
 248  McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 32. 
 249  Id. at 33. 
 250  Harris, supra note 224, at 911 (citing Galanter, supra note 224, at 154). 
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legislation alone can ensure agency implementation of rights.251  
Barriers to implementation frequently include budgetary constraints, 
waning political commitment, and administrative resource constraints; 
however, implementation can also be thwarted by agencies’ general 
resistance to change.252  So homeless advocates, Harris contends, must 
carve out means to influence the implementation process.253  “Court 
orders and judicially constructed remedies can provide lawyers points 
of access to implementation decisions” through specific provisions for 
ongoing court supervision, the designation of independent monitors, 
and the incorporation of advocates within the agency decision-making 
and implementation process.254  By “penetrating” the implementation 
process, advocates can help to overcome barriers to implementation 
by influencing agency policies and practices.255  Rights implementation 
is most likely to occur when advocates persuade agencies that changes 
in their administrative practices are in the agencies’ best interest.256  
Such interest convergence occurs when advocates “transform their 
substantive legal frames and agendas into organizational 
infrastructures that enhance, rather than threat, the reputations of the 
targeted organizations.”257 
Therefore, homeless bills of rights are more likely to be realized 
when advocates secure a role in the implementation process.258  
Because administrative agencies, including law enforcement, play such 
a significant role in the rights experience of homeless Americans, the 
relevance of implementation becomes even more pronounced.  So far, 
mainland bills appear to concentrate on judicial enforcement, but 
 
 251  Id. at 911–16 (reviewing related sociolegal scholarship). 
 252  See generally, id.  
 253  Id. 
 254  Id. 
 255  Id. at 915. 
 256  Harris, supra note 224, at 916. 
 257  Id.  Harris’s point invokes Derek Bell’s interest convergence theory, which 
essentially contends that civil rights progress (especially affirmative action) only occurs 
when it benefits white elites.  See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 149 (2004) (referring to 
Grutter as a “prime example” of the interest-convergence thesis).  See also Harvey, supra 
note 1, at 721 (“Particular claims do not take hold in a society and become 
institutionalized unless they serve the interests and attract the enduring support of 
strategically powerful interest groups.”). 
 258  Harris, supra note 224, at 933.  Harris’s work suggests other factors can impact 
whether a rights claim is successfully realized through the implementation process, 
including whether the court assumes an ongoing oversight role, whether 
organizational outcomes are monitored, and whether methods of accountability are 
enforced.  Id. 
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have not yet incorporated administrative implementation provisions.  
Puerto Rico’s legislation is impressive for its attention to administrative 
implementation.  For example, the laws establish a multi-sector 
Commission, the Commission’s membership must include at least two 
homeless residents, and the Commission’s duties involve the 
development of substantive policies, implementation plans, and forms 
of assessment.259  Puerto Rico’s legislation, however, is hampered by a 
structural conflict of interest because the same agency develops, 
implements, and enforces the law.260  But if Puerto Rico incorporates 
judicial enforcement provisions and corrects the structural conflicts of 
interest, those modifications could have significant results.  Ideally, 
advocates would also consider the specific structural and strategic 
advice from Beth Harris’s careful analysis of the implementation of 
homeless rights laws.261 
But interest in homeless bills of rights should also appreciate that 
the realization of homeless rights even exceeds judicial enforcement 
and agency implementation.  Some argue that there is no such thing 
as an unenforced right; such “rights” amount only to “toothless” moral 
claims.262  As explained above, judicially enforceable laws certainly can 
be valuable tools in rights advocacy.  But there are reasons why 
advocates still might want to pursue homeless bills of rights, even if the 
prospects of judicial enforcement or agency implementation currently 
seem depressed.  As a primary matter, it is too simplistic to equate 
enforcement with a right; such an absolute posture 
treats enforceability as though it were a switch with only two 
positions—on or off.  Reality is far more complicated . . . 
[because] the practical enforceability of rules depends on a 
range of other factors such as how much money a potential 
plaintiff has to spend on legal fees, the current state of public 
opinion, and even the identity of the judge to whom a case is 
assigned . . . .  To define legal rights as synonymous with legal 
outcomes, or even “expected” legal outcomes, fails 
adequately to account for the grey areas and uncertainties 
that define the ground between what the law promises (or 
 
 259  See discussion supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text.  
 260  See discussion supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text.  
 261  See generally Harris, supra note 224.  
 262  See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 17 (calling unenforced moral rights 
“toothless by definition”).  Many advocates interviewed for this Article agreed with this 
characterization of unenforceable rights.  See, e.g., Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 
(contrasting “feel good” laws with “enforceable” ones); Interview with Arms, supra note 
65 (explaining that “watered down” bills are inadequate because they do not have any 
“teeth” and are “basically feel good measures”); Interview with Eisinger, supra note 64 
(stressing the need for laws to be more than “just for show”). 
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seems to promise) and what it delivers in fact.263 
Even under projections where homeless bills of rights are not 
likely to be immediately enforced or implemented, this new legislative 
tool can still serve a valuable role in publicizing and catalyzing 
homeless rights claims.  Marc Galanter famously suggested that the law 
should be understood “as a system of cultural and symbolic meanings 
[rather] than as a set of operative controls.”264  In other words, 
homeless bills of rights, as a statutory legal medium, may indirectly 
support homeless rights advocacy through “centrifugal” and 
“radiating” effects on the social movement building process.265  These 
effects include “catalyzing movement building efforts, generating 
public support for new rights claims, or providing pressure to 
supplement other political tactics.”266  This perspective liberates rights 
from the confines of the judiciary, recognizing that rights are “claimed 
and negotiated in a wide variety of settings, including courts but also 
legislatures, agencies, the workplace, the media, public squares and 
private interactions, and how these various forms of activism influence 
one another in complex ways.”267 
In summary, judicial enforcement is not the only relevant venue 
for realizing rights; other government agencies and social settings 
negotiate rights and contribute to their definition.268  This broader 
perspective of rights discourse helps to explain why social movements 
must anticipate the relationship between the law and rights 
consciousness. 
 
 
 263  Harvey, supra note 1, at 712–13. 
 264  Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects on Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT 
COURTS 117, 127 (Keith Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983).   
 265  Id. 
 266  McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 230 (discussing Galanter’s 
theory). 
 267  Southworth, supra note 214, at 1214 (citing Helena Silverstein, UNLEASHING 
RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (1996) (discussing 
McCann’s work).  Advocates know well that social change is always “an inside game 
and an outside game.”  Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 (explaining the need to 
work not only with political insiders, but also with the media and other aspects of the 
public to create a receptive environment for homeless advocacy); McCann, Legal 
Mobilization, supra note 210, at 235 (discussing benefits of media coverage to social 
movements). 
 268  Southworth, supra note 214, at 1208 (“Courts . . . are not the only arenas in 
which activists invoke rights claims and attempt to give them legal force, and they are 
not the only institutions to have contributed to the expansion of individual rights.”). 
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D. Homeless Rights Consciousness 
The fourth “necessary condition” for a rights revolution is a 
culture of rights consciousness.  Generally speaking, American culture 
is a “rights conscious” culture, but private and institutionalized biases 
against the poor (and the homeless in particular) make this 
consciousness contextual.  In other words, this rights consciousness is 
more generous on a general and abstract level, and less so when 
applied directly to individuals that are largely rejected by society, such 
as the homeless.  A wealth of research showing negative societal 
attitudes toward the homeless269 and the prevalence of discriminatory 
laws targeting the homeless270 support this proposition.  Indeed, social 
movement scholars seem to recognize that the poor and homeless are 
generally less successful in legal mobilization, “largely owing to the 
absence of favorable social conditions.”271  Put more bluntly, prevalent, 
negative societal attitudes toward the homeless limit the potential of 
movement mobilization.  These limitations persist not only in the 
biases of housed individuals, but also in the learned disengagement of 
homeless people themselves.272  Legal mobilization research suggests 
 
 269  See discussion supra Part I.A.  
 270  See discussion supra Part I.B.  
 271  See, e.g., McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 34 (“[W]elfare 
rights and the rights of the homeless—have found very little at all to cheer about in 
the records of legal action.”). 
 272  See generally Michael McCann, Expanding the Horizons of Horizontal Inquiry into 
Rights Consciousness: An Engagement with David Engel, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 467, 
471–72 (2012) (discussing how “marginal groups, especially the poor” may be 
unengaged in rights advocacy in part because they “internalize blame and endure 
when they suffer injury”).  Joel Blau further explains how the experience of 
homelessness can undermine legal and political rights engagement: 
Political activity requires a certain minimal self-confidence, a belief in 
one’s power to bring about change.  Yet loss of this faith is one of the 
first psychological effects of homelessness.  Stigmatized and facing 
constant rejection, many homeless people gradually come to accept the 
world’s own view of them, and this self-image gradually destroys their 
feelings of political efficacy.  The message is a simple one:  someone 
without a home is an inconsequential person, and the actions of an 
inconsequential person cannot have political consequences. 
BLAU, supra note 25, at 94.  Moreover, research suggests that legal mobilization is least 
likely to succeed “among persons unattached to relatively stable associational 
networks, caught in ‘dead end’ life situations where opportunity structures vary little, 
and lacking material resource support for defiant action.”  McCann, Legal Mobilization, 
supra note 210, at 240.  These trends “help explain why legal advocacy for 
[marginalized groups like the homeless] offers little hope of empowerment, and may 
even add to their victimization.”  Id. at 240–41.  Nonetheless, McCann and others 
conclude that legal mobilization can be particularly helpful in early stages of a social 
movement, through agenda-setting, building constituencies, and generating new 
rights claims and consciousness.  Id. at 276 (reviewing various “pessimistic” legal 
mobilization theories and urging a “more subtle, complex, and balanced perspective” 
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that “the capacity and inclination of people to envision law as an 
appropriate resource for pursuing their interests varies based upon 
social location,” including class and wealth.273  Given that the status quo 
is generally antagonistic—or at best, apathetic—to homeless rights and 
given that homeless people face extraordinary obstacles to collective 
mobilization, the outlook for a homeless rights revolution may appear 
pessimistic.  But, as explained below, homeless bills of rights might 
help. 
V. THE ROLE OF HOMELESS BILLS OF RIGHTS 
The most frequently expressed criticism of economic and social human rights 
is that they are mere aspirations to which governments may pay lip-service but have 
no duty to secure in practice.  What these critics fail to note is that this is true of 
virtually all human rights claims when they are first accorded formal 
recognition . . . .  Indeed, the aspirational recognition of unenforced rights may be 
a necessary stage in their historical development.274 
 
Even if the requisite conditions for a homeless social movement 
do not yet exist, homeless bills of rights can help to make conditions 
more conducive to change.  Given the pervasive discrimination and 
hostility homeless people continue to face, homeless bills of rights are 
arguably emerging in the nascent stages of a potential rights 
revolution.  Thus, homeless bills of rights might be a significant initial 
step in forming a new rights consciousness; even if they face challenges 
in enforcement and implementation, these emerging laws can 
transform the “discursive possibility and relational power . . . to some 
degree.”275  After all, “[p]erhaps the most significant point at which law 
matters for many social movements is during the earliest phases of 
organizational and agenda formation.”276  Developing laws can serve as 
a catalyst to raise consciousness about the rights of marginalized 
groups, like the homeless, by setting an agenda in “which movement 
 
on the potential usefulness of legal rights advocacy to social movements).  Indeed, the 
codification of homeless rights may be one of the few forms of “bargaining leverage” 
available to homeless people.  See, e.g., id. at 246.  Finally, Marc Galanter and Beth 
Harris’s work clearly establishes the ability of poverty lawyers to use such leverage from 
judicial decisions through the implementation process, ultimately shaping norms, 
policies, and actions within administrative agencies.  Harris, supra note 224, at 912–16 
(discussing Galanter’s work and the role of lawyers in the implementation of 
redistributive reforms that benefit homeless people). 
 273  Jeffrey R. Dudas, Book Review of Law and Social Movements: Contemporary 
Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17 (2006) (book review). 
 274  Harvey, supra note 1, 717–18. 
 275  McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 34. 
 276  Id. at 25. 
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actors draw on legal discourses to name and to challenge existing 
social wrongs or injustices.”277  Laws that clearly announce civil, 
constitutional, and human rights—like the homeless bills of rights—
facilitate new discursive, epistemological, and normative grounding 
for social movements.278 
Rather than expressing the rules we currently are willing to 
live by, human rights norms tend always to exceed our reach.  
They are a kind of law by which human societies set goals for 
themselves.  By asserting that everyone has these rights, even 
when we are not prepared to honor them in practice, we 
challenge ourselves to live up to our own aspirations . . . .  
That may not sound like true law, but given the power of 
human rights claims to drive the historical process, it would 
be foolish to dismiss human rights proclamations as toothless 
or lacking in legitimacy simply because the struggle to 
enforce them has yet to be won.279 
Instead, homeless bills of rights can be understood as playing a 
potentially significant role in the evolution of a homeless rights 
revolution.  Certainly, so far, the newly enacted laws generally affirm 
that homeless citizens should be entitled to the same rights as those 
afforded to the housed, such as rights to freedom from discrimination 
or rights to privacy and property.  Some of these rights claims (at least 
when applied to homeless people) may not seem generally accepted, 
enforceable, or even likely to be implemented.  But, as with many 
fundamental rights, “bits and pieces” can be gradually secured over 
time.280  As homeless rights claims are incrementally secured, the rights 
agenda can grow and expand.281  Rights advocates understand their 
work is never truly done; the hallmark of such fundamental rights 
claims is that they “remain a work in progress rather than a finished 
project.”282  The evolutionary process of agenda building around rights 
 
 277  Id.; see also Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature 
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 76 (2001) (“A statute . . . may provide an 
opportunity for identity formation by a group of potential participants.”). 
 278  McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 25–29; see also Dudas, supra 
note 273, at 1 (citing MCCANN, supra note 235; STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS 
OF RIGHTS:  LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE (U. Mich. Press, 2d. ed. 
2004); Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the Name of Equal Rights: ‘Special’ Rights and the Politics of 
Resentment in Post-Civil Rights America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 723 (2005)). 
 279  Harvey, supra note 1, at 718–19. 
 280  Id. at 722. 
 281  Id. (“The second thing that happens when rights are partially secured is  
that . . . .  People reconceive the practical policy goals embodied in the right, raising 
their sights in a way that always leaves the right beyond their grasp.  In other words, 
the right remains aspirational.”). 
 282  Id. at 723.  Harvey also describes the efforts of rights advocates as “hav[ing] 
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claims is particularly pronounced where, as here, the basic rights 
denied to a marginalized group of people are otherwise considered 
basic, fundamental human rights. 
At their core, homeless bills of rights can help to educate, raise 
awareness, and increase understanding about the unfair 
discrimination and hostility homeless people commonly experience.283  
Housed society is generally familiar with and accepting of rights 
discourse, including statutory rights.  The codification of rights for 
homeless people, then, is a particularly visible venue for impacting 
rights consciousness.  The enactment of homeless bills of rights 
might—and hopefully will—strike housed Americans as odd, 
prompting questions like: Aren’t these rights the same rights 
“everyone” enjoys? Why do homeless people need a separate 
affirmation of these fundamental rights?  Such dissonance creates a 
unique opportunity to change public perceptions and attitudes about 
homelessness. 
Moreover, the codification of fundamental rights might not just 
educate the housed public, but it could help to empower advocates 
and homeless citizens.  As advocates help to inform homeless people 
about their options for asserting claims pursuant to these new laws, 
homeless citizens might sense legitimate entitlement to better, fairer 
conditions.  “[W]hen citizens begin to assert their rights that imply 
demands for change, there develops a new sense of efficacy; people 
who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe they have 
some capacity to alter their lot.”284 
The current deficit of homeless rights consciousness can be a 
major motivation behind homeless bills of rights.  At a minimum, 
homeless bills of rights will provoke conversation and increase 
opportunities for housed individuals to consider and discuss homeless 
rights.  The potential shift in discursive possibility can impact housed 
society and its proxies in the legislature, law enforcement, and other 
administrative agencies.  Accordingly, in instances where the 
legislature opens the door to specific expressions of homeless rights—
even slightly, as it has done in some jurisdictions with homeless bills of 
 
many way stations but no real terminus.”  Id. at 724.  See also McCann, Legal Mobilization, 
supra note 210, at 238 (describing analogous pay equity claims advocates as viewing 
these claims as “one historical step in the long-term struggle for progressive wealth 
redistribution in modern society.”). 
 283  McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 234 (“At the most minimal level, 
legal rights advocacy holds the potential for simply expanding citizen awareness and 
understanding about social relations; in short, in can help to educate citizens about 
the systematic sources and character of unjust victimization.”). 
 284  Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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rights—such legislation presents an opportunity to transform basic 
rights consciousness.  Perhaps these homeless bills of rights will have 
their most enduring impact on the American culture of rights 
discourse. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The naming of homeless rights in legal practice is, of course, 
constrained by societal attitudes toward these rights.285  The trend so 
far suggests that advocates’ top priorities are not likely to be 
incorporated into a homeless bill of rights—at least on the mainland.  
As demonstrated above, efforts to improve the lives of homeless 
Americans commonly value positive rights, such as affordable housing 
and healthcare, as well as negative rights, such as the abrogation of 
homeless criminalization laws.  Although the mainland effort is in its 
very early stages, none of the currently enacted mainland bills—Rhode 
Island, Illinois, or Connecticut—specifically incorporate these top 
priorities.286  California’s proposed bill tried to test these boundaries; 
although the bill made significant progress, it ultimately failed.  At least 
for now, the newly enacted laws generally affirm that homeless citizens 
should be entitled to the same rights as those afforded to the housed, 
such as rights to freedom from discrimination or rights to privacy and 
property.  Although the Puerto Rico legislation has a much more 
expansive substantive reach, the island’s experience suggests that even 
if these rights are enacted, they may not be successfully implemented.  
This leaves some advocates wondering whether homeless bills of rights 
are worth the investment. 
But one reason these laws are likely to be limited as proposed, 
enforced, or implemented actually demonstrates why these laws are 
necessary: housed society generally perceives homeless people as non-
human.  Putting aside common economic objections to positive 
rights,287 the general mainland resistance to anti-criminalization 
measures reflects popular attitudes among housed Americans: we do 
not like to be confronted with visible poverty.288  We also prefer to 
blame homeless people for their own condition, which expunges any 
 
 285  Id. at 230 (explaining that legal practice both constraints and expands 
possibilities in rights discourse). 
 286  Of course, advocates have secured some targeted successes with respect to these 
priorities, but so far these successes are not related to codification in homeless bills of 
rights. 
 287  See generally Cross, supra note 66, at 880–87; discussion supra notes 72–76.  
 288  2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31.  See generally 2014 NLCHP Report, supra 
note 31. 
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sense of obligation to support or protect homeless rights.289  So perhaps 
the greatest obstacle to homeless rights stems from a lack of legal rights 
consciousness about homeless people and the extraordinary 
persecution and discrimination these men, women, and children 
endure as a result. 
Homeless bills of rights present an important opportunity to 
impact American rights consciousness.  The emergence of these new 
laws may encourage housed Americans to confront—and perhaps one 
day, overcome—our persistent, deeply-rooted biases against the 
homeless.  Regardless of whether homeless advocates’ ideal provisions 
are enacted, enforced, or implemented in the near future, even 
modest versions of these new laws can stake an important claim in the 
movement building process.  After all, the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence and the Bill of Rights remained dormant and 
aspirational for years after their enactment, but like all declarations of 
fundamental rights, these documents set crucial goals for society to 
achieve over time.290 
Such is the slippery and complex nature of rights.  Perhaps no 
other topic generates the same richness of debate: what are rights; 
when do rights exist; how do rights (and should they) influence or 
control the behavior of government and individuals?  Ultimately, it is 
through this rabbit hole that homeless bills of rights must travel.  To 
be sure, it is not a simple journey, but the quest will be worthwhile if 
these new laws can make a meaningful difference in the rights of 
homeless people, and how housed Americans value and recognize 
them. 
  
 
 289  See discussion supra, at Part I.B.  
 290  Harvey, supra note 1, at 717–18. 
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Table 1:  Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons of Provisions 
The chart below compares common provisions among current 
mainland drafts of homeless bills of rights.  Puerto Rico’s legislation is 
excluded from this chart due to its unique provisions. 
Key 
P1………………Included in proposed legislation 
P2………………Included in substitute legislation  
(only  applicable to RI, HI, IL, CT, and CA) 
L………………..Included in engrossed legislation  
(only applicable to RI, HI, IL, CT, and CA) 
X……………….Not included 
Com…………In Committee 
 
 RI HI IL CT OR VT MO MS CA 
Date introduced 
1/11/12 1/23/13 1/30/13 2/15/13 2/21/13 3/12/13 3/13/13 5/13/13 12/3/12 
Bill number 
SB 2502 HB 
1205 
(P1), 
1889 
(P2), 
2661 
(L) 
SB 1210 SSB 896 HB 3122 HB 493 SB 428 H.3595 AB 5 
Status Signed into law 
Both in 
com. 
Signed 
into law
Signed into 
law
Com. Com. Com. Com. Suspended 
Right to. . .        
Housing status/
homeless 
person 
definition 
P1, P2, L P2, L P1, P2 
removed, 
L 
replaced  
P1, P2, L 
altered 
P1 P1  P1 P1 P1, P2 
Move freely P1, P2, L P2, L P1, P2, L P1, P2, L P1 P1 P1 P1 P1, P2, L 
Equal treatment 
P1, P2, L 
(amended 
terms 
used) 
P1, P2, 
L 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, L P1 P1 P1 P1 P1, P2 specifies 
law enforce-
ment, L 
Seek, maintain 
employment 
P1, P2 
added 
maintain, 
L 
P1, P2, 
L 
P1, P2 
removed 
“seek”, L 
enrolls
P1, P2, L P1 P1 P1 P1 P1, P2 
Emergency 
medical care 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, 
L 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, L P1 P1 P1 P1 P1, P2 
Vote P1, P2, L P1, P2, L 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, L P1 P1 P1 P1 P1, P2 
Information 
disclosure 
protection 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, 
L 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, L P1 P1 P1 P1 P1, P2, L 
removes 
Personal 
property 
privacy 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, 
L 
P1, P2, L P1, P2, L P1 P1 P1 P1 P1, P2 
Attorney’s fees P2, L P1 P1, P2, L X X X P1 X P1, P2 
Public notice 
X P2 X P1, P2, L 
changed 
“shall” post 
notice to 
“may”
X X X X X 
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Civil 
enforcement 
X P1 P1, P2, L X P1  P1 P1 X P1, P2 
Criminal 
enforcement 
X X X X X X P1  X X 
Keep property 
in public 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2, L 
removes 
Immunity for 
state workers 
helping 
homeless 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Counsel P1, P2 removes 
X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Enrollment of 
kids in school 
X X X X X P1 X X P1, P2, L 
removes 
School supplies X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Forbids refusal 
to rent or sell 
property 
X X X X X X P1 X P1, P2, L 
Share/give food X X X X X X X X P1, P2, L removes 
Clean 
restrooms 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Income for 
survival 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Restitution for 
loss of property 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Free from 
arbitrary arrest 
X X X X X X X X P2, P3 removes 
Affordable 
housing 
P1, P2 
removes 
X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Clean 
temporary 
housing 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Refuse service 
in shelter 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 
Occupy 
vehicles 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 
Rest in public 
P2 adds X X X X X X X P1, P2 adds 
sleep, L 
removes sleep 
Conduct life 
sustaining 
activities in 
public 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Practice 
religion in 
public 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 
Be self-
employed 
X X X X X X X X P2 
Medical 
facilities 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Hygienic 
facilities 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 
Hygienic 
provisions 
X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
Clean water X X X X X X X X P1, P2 removes 
 
 
